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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

CYBERSPACE INVADES THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
Where do we go from here?

Long before our nation was created, European Countries acknowledged the importance of free
speech. Despite this, Great Britain later denied this right to the New England Colonies. Over the
last two centuries many battles have been fought to make freedom of speech an inalienable right to
be shared by all. A good portion of these battles have been fought in courtrooms. Judge and
Supreme Court justices have dealt with issues ranging from what is a public figure to what is
indecent speech. Many of these issues are not found in the original text of the Constitution. This has
forced the judges to devise tests to determine certain standards and to make discretionary choices.
Today’s public officials are dealing with issues that have never been dealt with before, such as
Internet speech and cyberspace libel. The decisions rendered by the courts on these new issues will
set a precedent for future generations. What kind of effect of this new territory, known as
cyberspace, will have on the First Amendment is yet to be seen.
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INTRODUCTION
Tired of English tyranny, our founding fathers approved a constitution and ten
amendments they hoped would build into the new government some limits so that abuses of power
could not happen.1 The first of these ten amendments was expected to be somewhat of a shield to
protect free speech and free press from government intervention.
It took time for the First Amendment to reach its full power. “Despite its well written
phrases and promises, the First Amendment did not end the barbaric English practice of punishing
seditious libel, which led to severe sanctions for mild criticism of government or its officials.” 2 The
First Amendment was a single, fragile sentence that did not carry the protective power it now does.
It took almost 150 years of challenges and Supreme Court decisions to reach the amount of freedom
the public and press now enjoy.
But once again, the power of the First Amendment is being challenged by new technology
and a new frontier. This new frontier is known as “Cyberspace.” It has no physical boundaries and
is available to anyone who either owns a computer or can get to the local library and turn on a
computer. Phrases such as the “information highway” and “user friendly” are fast becoming common
place.
Inspite of its popularity, the word “Internet” was somewhat foreign to many people even a
decade ago. Actually, the term is almost 40 years old. The Internet began in 1957 when the
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was created within the Defense Department as a
response to the Russian launch of the Sputnik Satellite.
In 1969 ARPA created a computer network known as ARPANET which lasted until 1989. In1972 email was created and in the 1980’s came the Internet. In the past decade the World Wide Web was
launched.
Today the Internet is a global super-network of 15,000 computer networks used by
millions of individuals, organizations, corporations and educational entities the world over.3 As the
Internet has developed, it has become a medium not only for entertainment, but also an important
source for information and news. 4 Every day more and more people travel use this new technology
as a method of communication.
This new type of technology is bringing people together, just as the roads and railways
did over a century ago. But this new highway is not made of asphalt and is not surrounded by a
landscape made up of trees, grass and sky. Instead of cars, planes or trains, the traveler on the
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Information Highway uses computers, telephone lines and modems. The keyboard and mouse are,
in a sense, the gas pedal that gets the user to where he/she is going, and the windshield replaces by
the computer screen. The traveler on this new super highway is world-wide, not just nation-wide. It
costs less to travel this way, and access is unlimited. Messages are sent and received almost
instantaneously.
Anyone who has access to the Internet can e-mail, get into chat rooms, post messages or
get information about any subject. The user does not have to be a journalist, have morals or sign a
creed of integrity or honesty. The information posted does not have to be verified or edited. This
information can be sent literally around the world with just a click of one’s finger on the mouse. To
make things more complicated, the user can almost be assured of total anonymity. Because of this
total anonymity, on-line defamation has received significant comment.5
Total anonymity is just one of the characteristics of cyberspace libel that makes it much
different than the traditional libel the courts have dealt with in the past. Even if the identity of the
person who has e-mail or a web site is known, it must be proven that particular person posted the
libelous material and not someone else just using that site. These situations bring new challenges to
the court system.
The Internet is still relatively new. Until just a few years ago, travelers on the Internet
had access but no rules by which to travel. It was not until 1997 that the Supreme Court granted the
Internet full First Amendment protection.6 In Reno vs. The ACLU, the Court agreed with a lower
court decision that the Internet is as diverse as human thought and concluded that “our cases provide
the basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.
The Court distinguished the Internet from other media such as broadcasting because “the Internet can
hardly be considered a scarce expressive commodity.”7
This landmark decision can be compared to another landmark decision made by the Supreme
Court in 1964 in the case of New York Times vs. Sullivan. 8 This was the case that laid the
foundations for future libel cases. The court ruled that it public officials must prove that statements
considered libelous were made with “actual malice that is, with knowledge that was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” 9 This case is only 36-years old. Before Sullivan,
there were no cut in stone rules on libel. Libel rules at the state level were applied to cases. This case
set a precedent and provided standards that have been used and will continue to be used in libel
cases. Applying these standards to libel that is committed in cyberspace is the challenge the Supreme
Court
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is now facing. It must protect First Amendment rights that have taken two centuries to achieve.
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The purpose of this paper is to provide a historical account of the First Amendment and
libel from constitutional times to the cyberspace era. By taking a critical look at the cyberspace libel
suits that have been filed over the last four years, it can be proven that the First Amendment is
strong, yet flexible enough, to govern this new territory. Areas that will be explored are:
1. History
A historical account of the First Amendment. This will include its fragile but weak beginnings
and its inability to curtail government persecution of publishers that dared to criticize the
government. It will also include a section on Kentucky’s fight for First Amendment rights.
A historical account of the Internet from 1957 to the present.
2. Libel Jurisprudence in America
The landmark decision made in the New York Times vs. Sullivan case set the standard for libel cases
that followed. It introduced such terms as “actual malice” and “reckless disregard.” The statutes that
were set in this case have been used and refined by the courts in our nation for the past 36 years.
3. Libel Jurisprudence
In the past two years there have been a few cyberpace libel suits filed and there will probably be
more. As with all laws suits, these cases can be extremely expensive to take to court. Cyberspace is
still a very new territory and the rules that govern this frontier are still being decided. A libel suit of
this nature can take a very long time. Once the suit is settled, the person found guilty of posting
libelous material may not have money or financial holdings to pay damages that might be awarded to
a grieved party. There have been law suits dealing with libel and the Internet and the judicial system
may see more. Even though these cases occur on a media that is different from traditional media,
there is no need for reinterpretation of the laws it took almost two centuries to make.

CHAPTER ONE
Freedom of the press:
The original American dream
In the beginning years of our country, the American dream was not a big house or a fancy
car. The first American dream was freedom. The early colonists wanted to be free to worship as
they pleased and to speak their minds without worrying about being jailed. Unfortunately for these
early colonists, freedom of speech was more of a dream than a reality. As late as 1854 French
historian Alexis de Tocqueville said: “I know no country in which there is so little true
independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in America…The majority raises very
formidable barriers to the liberty of opinion: within these barriers an author may write whatever he
pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond them.”10
To someone such as de Tocqueville it would be hard to imagine that a century later both
men and women would be marching in the streets and voicing their opinions on government
legislation. The 1960s gave rise to civil rights and anti-war demonstrations. These demonstrators
may not have worried as much as maybe their ancestors about being put in jail for seditious libel.
The formidable barriers that Tocqueville wrote about had vanished. It took brave men and women
and landmark court cases to make these barriers fall. The fear of speaking out against the
government is a fear that the colonist brought from England and kept with them even after the United
States was an independent country.
Early Trailblazers of the Colonial Press
The first printing press was brought over by colonists within the first 20 years of living in the
new world. It was strictly used for religious material. In 1704 The Boston News-Letter printed its
first issue. It was more careful about what it published, so it was allowed to continue.11 By 1771
there were 25 newspapers being published in the new world. Since the English colonies had
inherited their censorship practice of all publications from Great Britain, the publisher of a
newspaper was liable to be arrested and prosecuted if he printed something any of the officials did
not like.12 However, there were some publishers that stepped out and felt the backlash of
suppression. James and Benjamin Franklin of Boston were just two of these publishers.
The elder brother, James, began publishing The New England Courant in 1721. Within a year he
was in thrown in jail because of a blistering news article on the ineffective defense the government
had against pirates who were preying on shipping in the area. 13 He spent a month in jail and the 16-
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year-old Benjamin became publisher.14 After getting out of jail, James Franklin continued to
criticize the government. Due to his criticism of the government, he was forbidden to publish again
unless it be approved by local officials. They also said he needed a license to publish.
Because the formal license laws were invalid in the Colonies, James Franklin went to
court. He fought the government’s attempt to bring back the practice of licensing. A grand jury
agreed with him and refused to indict him on a contempt of court charge for publishing without
permission from the government. 15The authorities gave up the fight against Franklin.
James Franklin, therefore, became a significant figure in the history of a free press in
America.16 By defying the royal government and the General Court, Franklin established the
principle that the government can not censor before publication.17 And the grand jury, by allowing
his defiance to succeed, affirmed the concept of an independent press responsible to its readers and
not to governmental authority.18
Franklin’s victory did not apply to other publishers in other colonies. In 1735 New York publisher
John Peter Zenger was jailed for nine months. Zenger, publisher of the New York Weekly Journal,
had criticized Royal Governor William Cosby. In his newspaper, Zenger accused the government of
endangering the rights and property of the public by tampering with trial by jury and rigging
elections.
Twice, a grand jury refused to indict Zenger for seditious libel and the elected assembly
refused to press charges. Finally Cosby’s council issued a warrant for his arrest.
Zenger was charged with sedition. During the nine month ordeal, the New York Weekly Journal
missed only one edition. Zenger’s wife and friends kept the publication alive. His supporters could
have raised the money necessary to get Zenger out of jail, but Zenger chose to stay there to win
sympathy and support from his readers.19
When he appeared in court, his lawyers were disbarred. Zenger asked for a court
appointed attorney and was given the services of John Chambers. Chambers was known to side
with the government and had no real experience with law. Chambers presented a weak defense for
his client. At that point, well known Philadelphia attorney Andrew Hamilton announced he would
participate in Zenger’s defense.
The Attorney General argued that whether or not libel was committed should be left to
the judges to decide.20 The Chief Justice agreed that the law of New York was accurately stated by
the 1606 Star Chamber case, de Libellis Famosis, which held that true statements could be
libelous.21 Hamilton argued that law was outdated and that truth was a defense against libel.
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At the heart of the defense was the right of the public to criticize the government.
Pressing
the case further, Hamilton suggested that what is good law in England is not necessarily good in
Aerica.22 He drove his argument for free speech closer to home by insisting that free speech was
particularly important in the American colonies where governors, representatives of the Crown,
cannot be brought to justice for their misdeeds.23
The governor’s powers allowed total control of the courts and therefore total control. Free speech,
Hamilton argued, was American’s best method of instilling a sense of duty and seeing that the
governing officials acted responsible.24 The jury agreed and after being in jail for nine months,
Zenger was a free man.
The Zenger trial while it significantly contributed to neutralizing seditious libel, by no
means guaranteed respect for freedom of the press in colonial New York.25 In effect, it transferred
the location of the principal threat to free speech from the courts to the legislature. For the
Assembly, standing upon its privileges and dignity, scared printers and authors into a cautious
exercise of their liberties by threatening to try them before its own bar, between 1747 and 1770. 26
Even though Zenger’s acquittal was hailed as a victory, the case did not set a binding precedent. It
did show the growing sentiment for freedom.27
The Bill of Rights
Once America had gained its independence from England, the Articles of Confederation
were put in place. It did not take long before they were proven inadequate and politicians met to put
together a constitution. The real debate that occurred at this convention was over whether or not to
have a “Bill of Rights” spelled out.
Federalist, such as George Washington, did not support the idea like the Anti-Federalists
did. Washington believed that the demand for a bill of rights was a mere
subterfuge for other objections that could not stand exposure “in open day.” 28 The Anti-Federalists
felt quite the opposite, even though several of the states had already written a Bill of Rights into their
own constitutions. They wanted a stronger version that would accompany the Constitution.
Government under the newly constructed constitution gave more power to the federal
government. Because state governments would become weaker, the Anti-Federalists believed that a
Bill of Rights should accompany this newly drafted constitution. This was not an issue that was
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settled overnight or in a few Congressional meetings. In fact, it became an issue in the first federal
election in 1788-89.29
Both parties bombarded each other with essays and news articles. Federalists
wrote 85 letters urging the ratification of the Constitution. The Federalist, as the letters became
known, appeared between 1787 and 1788 in the Independent Journal, a semi-weekly New York
newspaper. Jay was seriously injured in a street riot shortly after the letters began appearing in the
paper and only contributed eight of the 85. Hamilton and Madison wrote the remainder.
Thomas Jefferson gave the Anti-Federalist party’s stance of the Bill of Rights issue much
needed support. Jefferson, celebrated author of the Declaration of Independence and the keeper of
the revolutionary faith that gave birth to America, believed that “a bill of rights is what the people
are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government
should refuse, or rest on inference.” 30
Virginia’s Richard Henry Lee was another champion of the Anti-Federalist movement.
He drafted several amendments that would resemble the 12 amendments that James Madison later
introduced to the states in September 1789. These amendments included freedom of the press and a
right of assembly and petition. Lee hoped the amendments he had written would be adopted by
Congress, but they were not.
In the end it would be James Madison who would get the job done. At first the Federalist
Party was not interested, but he persisted. He believed that a bill of rights would give the public
more confidence in the government. Madison realized that the introduction of serious rights
proposals “will kill the opposition everywhere, and by putting an end to disaffection to the
Government itself, enable the administration to venture on measures not otherwise safe.” 31
Madison served on a committee for the 1776 Virginia Constitution. He relied heavily on
that document in putting together his proposed amendments.32 These amendments were prepared in a
form that would have them incorporated into the Constitution. At first there was much opposition to
the proposed amendments. Only ten of the twelve amendments introduced by Madison were ratified
by the states. And finally two years later, Virginia became the last state necessary to complete the
ratification process.
The Alien and Sedition Acts
With the ratification of the Bill of Rights in1791 freedom of speech took a big step
forward. Just eight years later, the process was somewhat reversed when the Alien and Sedition Acts
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were imposed. These laws, supported heavily by President John Adams, pitted Adams’ Federalist
Party against the Democratic-Republican party. The laws were passed to silence
opposition to an expected war with France. Neither country had declared war, but had fought many
battles against each other on the water. The Republican Party sided with the French, while the
Federalist Party tended to favor the British. The Alien and Sedition Acts were actually three laws
that dealt with aliens and one law dealing with seditious libel. The Alien Enemies Act gave the
President the right to imprison or deport any person from a country that was considered to be an
enemy of the United States.
The Alien Friends Act allowed people from nations considered to be friendly by the
United States to be deported if the President thought they were dangerous. The Naturalization Act
required an immigrant to live in this country for 14 years before becoming a citizen. The Sedition
Act punished anyone who criticized the government.
The Sedition Act brought back the law of seditious libel that had been almost done away
with when Zenger was acquitted. The Sedition Act made it a crime, subject to five years’
imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, to: write, print or publish, or…knowingly and willingly assist or
aid in writing, printing ,uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings
against the government of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to
defame the said government, …or to bring them…into contempt or disrepute: or to excite against
them…the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United
States.33
The Alien Act was directed mainly against the French and Irish immigrants, most
of them Republicans.34 These three laws gave the president the power to deport anyone not born
here without a hearing or any real specific reason other than just being a threat to the government.
Although these laws were never really enforced, many aliens, in acute apprehension, either fled the
country or went into hiding.35
The Sedition Act was enforced. Under these laws, 25 arrests and 15 indictments
were made and no one was immune. Congressmen Matthew Lyon of Vermont became the first
victim. Lyon, an Irishman, had written a letter to the Vermont Journal in response to a bitter attack
made against him by the Federalist Party. He was charged with sedition. Although he used truth as
a defense, he was sentenced to two months in jail and fined almost $1,100. While he was in jail, he
was elected to serve a second term by an overwhelming majority. Even after he had served his
sentence, he stayed in jail until the fine was paid. The money to pay the fine was raised by
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constituents like Anthony Haswell, publisher of the Vermont Gazette.
Haswell condemned the trial against Lyon as “persecution” and not prosecution.
Haswell’s paper launched a bitter attack on the Federalist Party. He received threats about being
arrested for treason and having his paper shut down. Haswell deemed these threats of treason as lies
and challenged the Federalist Party to prove them. Just before Lyon was to get out of jail, Haswell
ran an advertisement for a lottery to help raise money to pay Lyon’s fine. He was arrested and
indicted on two counts of seditious utterances that were contained in the ad. The first count was
false malicious wicked and seditious libel against the United States. The charge was based on the
wording of the lottery ad. The second count was on an accompanying paragraph from the
Philadelphia Aurora that attacked the Adams administration for firing people for their political
beliefs.
Haswell told the court that the lottery ad was just an advertisement and that he did not
write it. The two people that wrote the advertisement testified in his behalf. On the second count, he
used truth as a defense. District Attorney Charles Marsh contended that since Haswell admitted
publishing the two items and pleaded their truth, the prosecutor contended, he had confessed his
guilt, because the doctrine of “the greater truth the greater the libel” applied under the common law
of criminal libel.
After opening arguments, Haswell was granted a postponement. And, unlike Lyon, he
was allowed to go free on $2,000 bond. After a lengthy trial, Haswell was fined $200 and assessed
court costs and sentenced to two months in the federal prison.36 He requested that he be allowed to
serve his sentence in his home town and four days later, unlike Lyon, his request was granted.
Besides Haswell, four other editors were imprisoned under the Sedition Act. The
prosecution that resulted in the longest jail sentence was in Dedham, Massachusetts. A group made
up a sign reading “No Stamp Act, No Sedition, No Alien Bills, No Land Tax; Downfall to the
Tyrants of America.” Authorities arrested two people, and they were indicted on a count of criminal
act of free expression. One expressed deep repentance. The other refused and would not name
names of his partners in this act. The defendant, a Revolutionary War Army Veteran and common
laborer with little formal education, was convicted of having a “rallying point of insurrection and
civil war.” He was sentenced and stayed in jail for two years.37
Kentucky Fights Back
The Alien and Sedition Acts was considered unfair by many. One of the most ardent
supporters of this belief was none other than Vice President Thomas Jefferson. He anonymously
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drafted a set of resolutions which later was called the Kentucky Resolutions. At that time, the author
of these Resolutions was a mystery. In 1821 Joseph Breckinridge, son of John Breckinridge, asked
Jefferson about the authorship of these documents and Jefferson reluctantly replied that he was the
author.
The heart of the resolutions stated that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional
and called on all of the states to declare them null and void. Jefferson wanted to give the states the
right or power to decide whether or not the Federal government had assumed unauthorized power.
He drew a significant distinction between actions involving the abuse of delegated powers and the
use of undelegated powers by the federal government. In the first instance, “a change by the people”
of those in power “would be the constitutional remedy.”38 But “where powers are assumed which
have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.”39
Once these resolutions became public, petitions with thousands of signatures began
pouring in to Congress. Week after week newspapers everywhere reported county mass meetings,
larger than any in history, which culminated in a series of resolutions that added the Alien and
Sedition Acts to the government’s policies already under attack.40 “Despite their most strenuous
efforts the Kentucky Federalists were able to secure only a few hundred signers for their own
remonstrance, and few of those who signed were considered to be men of any position or
respectability.”41
The largest protest meeting held in the state occurred in Lexington. Some 4,000-6,000
people gathered to hear George Nicholas speak.42 Nicholas was an attorney and Kentucky’s first
Attorney General. In early 1799 he published a pamphlet stating that Kentuckians would obey all
constitutional laws, but would ignore those that were both unconstitutional and impolitic.
Nonetheless, he added, “we contemplate no means of opposition, even to these unconstitutional acts,
but an appeal to the real laws of our country.”43
Nicholas, considered to be the most popular Republican leader in the state at that time,
delivered a rousing speech.44 He questioned the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition Acts and
accused the President and his party of tyranny. Nicholas’ speech was followed by a young, up and
coming lawyer named Henry Clay. His speech only added to the crowd’s furor. Two Federalists
who attempted to reply from the wagon-bed platform were rudely hustled away.45
Although his presence was not accounted for, another prominent Kentucky politician was
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presumed to be in the crowd that day. John Breckinridge, the former Kentucky Attorney General and
Fayette County delegate to the State House of Representatives, believed that the Alien and Sedition
Acts were unconstitutional. Breckinridge played an important role in getting the Kentucky
Resolutions passed. He was convinced that sentiment in Kentucky was so unanimous that any
attempt to enforce the Alien and Sedition Laws would be publicly resisted and expelled.46
Breckinridge showed up in Virginia not long after the Lexington rally. He had been in
poor health and had been advised to visit the Virginia Sweet Springs.47 From August until
November he stayed in Virginia. It is not clear what he did while there, but upon his return to
Kentucky he had with him a draft of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. They were given to him by
Wilson Cary Nicholas, brother of George Nicholas.
The Kentucky Resolutions were introduced in the General Assembly on
November 5. Breckinridge had made a couple of changes to the original resolutions. Jefferson’s
original draft declared that “where powers are assumed, which have not been delegated, a
nullification of the act is the rightful remedy;…every State has a natural right in cases not within the
compact…to nullify of their own authority, all assumptions of power by others within their limits.
The States were invited to concur in declaring these acts void and of no force and to take measures
for insuring that neither the acts complained of nor any others, not plainly and intentionally
authorized by the Constitution shall be exercised within their respective territories.” 48
The omission of these phrases weakened the stance taken by the Kentucky lawmakers.49
This may have been deliberately done by Breckinridge in order to make sure the resolutions were
accepted. 50 Jefferson had intended to bypass Congress with his claims that it was a mere compact
and that the states had the power to declare The Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional.51 Instead,
Breckingridge weakened Jefferson’s intent by stating that appeals to declare the Alien and Sedition
Acts unconstitutional should be directed to Congress.52
This set of resolutions was the only topic of that General Assembly. The key debate
against ratification came from William Murray, a Federalist lawyer, who tried in vain to stop the tide
of dissent against the Federalist Party.53 Murray had received a copy of the resolutions only a few
minutes before entering the House, so he had to content himself with discussing general principles
rather than proposing specific amendments which might make the resolutions more to the Federalist
point of view.54
He argued that if the House approved the resolutions it would be violating the
Constitution by assuming unwarranted rights, for the state had no right to censure the Federal
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Government. Within the government, he contended, only the judiciary could declare Congressional
Acts to be unconstitutional. “Murray admitted that the acts involved might have been impolitic, but
he damned the heat and haste with which they had been considered.”55
Then Breckinridge gave his response. He asserted that the states did have the right to
declare null and void any law that was unconstitutional. He contended that Congress and the states
were both a part of the compact, and therefore the states had the right to ensure the federal
government. He further asserted that:
“If Congress should still try to enforce them, I hesitate not to declare it as
my opinion that it is then the right and duty of the several states to nullify
those acts, and to protect their citizens from their operations. Congress
should always have enough virtue wisdom, and prudence, however to
expurge such laws when requested to do so by a majority of the states.”56
The Kentucky General Assembly passed the resolutions with little debate. On Nov.13 the
Kentucky Senate unanimously passed the resolutions and Gov. James Garrard signed them three
days later.57 Kentucky’s public reaction to the ratification followed closely along party lines.58 A
few Federalists protested the passing of the resolutions, mostly Kentucky residents had never been
more united in their political sentiments.59
Breckinridge and Jefferson’s home state of Virginia was next. The Virginia legislature ratified a set
of resolutions similar to those passed in Kentucky. However, Virginia and Kentucky stood alone.
All other state legislatures either voiced disapproval or stayed silent.
Making a Refuge for the Oppressed
The Alien and Sedition Acts became part of the political platform for the upcoming
presidential election of 1800. Even though Kentucky and Virginia received no support from their
sister states in adopting the resolutions, the political scene had changed enough between 1798 and
1800 for Jefferson to win the election. As President, Jefferson pardoned those who had been
convicted under the Sedition Laws.60 Over a period of time, Congress also repaid most of the fines.
The Sedition Act expired in 1801 and was not renewed by Congress. Although none of
the court cases related to the Sedition Acts ever made it to the Supreme Court, Justice William
Brennan, writing in the New York Times v. Sullivan, declared The Sedition Act invalid.61
The Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918
The Alien and Sedition Acts were invoked because of the fear of a war with France.
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This same type of fear caused similar laws such as The Espionage Act of 1917. This law was
enforced at the onset of World War I.62 The Espionage Act “made it a crime punishable by a twentyyear jail term or a $10,000 fine to willfully convey false reports or false statements with intent to
interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval force of the United States or to
promote the success of its enemies…or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or
refusal of duty, the military or naval forces of the United States or…willfully obstruct the recruiting
or enlistment service of the United States.” 63
The First Amendment received another blow the following year when Congress passed an
amendment known as the Sedition Act.64 This amendment made it a crime to “utter, print, write, or
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of government of the
Untied States, or the Constitution of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of the
United States, or to promote the cause of its enemies.” 65
Just as with the Alien and Sedition Laws, no one was immune from prosecution. In December 1917,
Reverend Samuel Sibert of Carmel, Illinois, was imprisoned because he preached a sermon on all
wars.66 In all 1,532 people were arrested for disloyal statements, 65 for threatening the president,
and 10 for sabotage.
“You can’t even collect your thoughts without getting arrested for unlawful assemblage,”
Max Eastman, editor of the Masses, told an audience in July 1917. “They give you ninety days for
quoting the Declaration of Independence, six months for quoting the Bible, and pretty soon
somebody is going to get a life sentence for quoting Woodrow Wilson in the wrong connection.” 67
Eastman and his publication was the first to feel the heavy hand of the government under
the Espionage Acts. Just one month after the law was enacted, the entire editorial board was charged
with conspiracy to obstruct the draft. This charge was based on four cartoon and four articles that
were printed in the August edition. The publication was seized by New York City Postmaster
Thomas Patton. He had been ordered to do so by the Postmaster General Albert Burleson. Eastman
and his staff took the matter to court.68
The case came under the jurisdiction of U.S. District Judge Learned Hand. Judge Hand ruled in
favor of Eastman and the Masses. In his opinion, he wrote that speech was constitutionally
protected unless it incited readers to violate the law. Judge Hand’s order was immediately blocked,
pending appeal. This appeal was overturned by the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals.69 The
Masses was allowed to be mailed.
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The First Amendment Establishes New Principles
Judge Hand’s decision in favor of freedom of speech was just the beginning of an era that established
the principles we now use in our courtrooms. Supreme Court Justices have developed “principle
tests” that are used when dealing with freedom of speech cases. These test are clear and present
danger70, bad tendency71, balancing72, preferred position73, and absolutism.74
Clear and Present Danger
In 1919 Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established the test of clear and
present danger in the case of Schenck v. United States. Charles Schenck, general secretary for the
Socialist party, printed and distributed 15,000 pamphlets criticizing the draft. He was convicted
under the Espionage Act. Holmes stated that if this had been peace time Schenck’s expression of
ideas would have had First Amendment protection. However because this was a time of war,
anything done to obstruct recruiting constituted clear and present danger.75 The case established that
dissent was not absolutely guaranteed, but rather depended upon circumstances of the case.
The Schenck test was used in two other cases involving the issue of dissent. In 1919,
Jacob Frohwerk76 published articles that encouraged people not to serve in the military forces. The
court held that these articles were in violation of the Espionage Act because World War 1 was in
progress and encouraging people not to serve created a clear and present danger to the freedom of the
United States. The other case involved Eugene Debs.77 At a Socialist convention, he stood up and
stated that the U.S. had no business being in WW1 and applauded people who tried to stop military
recruitment. The court held that Debs action, again because of war time, represented clear and
present danger and therefore was guilty under the Espionage Act.
In Abrams v. United States, Holmes clarified the nature of the clear and present danger
test. In his dissenting opinion he wrote: “The government may punish expression “that produces or
is intending to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils.” Holmes emphasized that “the power is greater in time of war than in time of peace
because war opens dangers that do not exist in time of peace."78
Bad Tendency
The test of “bad tendency” was established in 1925 when Benjamin Gitlow and three
other members of the socialist party were indicted on a New York Court for espionage. They had
published a radical article in the pamphlet The Revolutionary Age. Gitlow’s article urged people to
use force to overthrow the government. A New York trial court convicted and sentenced them to five
to ten years hard labor. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decision.
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In his opinion Justice Edward Sanford wrote that “such utterances, by their very nature,
involves danger to the public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the
peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial,
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen.” 79 The Court made a decision on
the fact that Gitlow’s publication urged people to use force to overthrow the government. If Gitlow
had written in a more abstract way, using a fictional government, he could not have been prosecuted.
Justice Sanford also wrote that he presumed the 14th Amendment also guaranteed that
state laws could not violate the First Amendment rights of citizens.80 This was an important step
because state judges are elected officials, unlike Supreme Court Justices who are appointed for life.
It could be possible for an elected official to have a decision influenced by an opinion group or
popular culture, especially if it just happens to be election year. Supreme Court Justices are
appointed for life and do not have to worry about being re-elected every so often.
Balancing
The “balancing test” deals with other rights that might come into conflict with the First
Amendment. For example if the regulation of a person’s behavior results in an abridgment of
speech, the court would have to determine which would have the greater protection or priority. This
was established in 1951 by Chief Justice Fred Vinson and used in several cases through out the
1950s and 1960s in such cases as Barenblatt v. United States (1959), Konigsberg v. State Bar of
California (1961), and Robel v.United States (1976). In Barenblatt, Justice John Harlan noted that
when First Amendment rights are asserted to prevent governmental inquiry, “resolution of the issues
always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public issues at stake in the
particular circumstances involved.” 81
In Konisberg, Justice John Harlan claimed that when constitutional protections
conflict with the exercise of valid governmental power, “a reconciliation must be effected, and that
perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective interests involved.” 82 In Robel, Chief
Justice Earl Warren acknowledged the “delicate and difficult task” facing the Court when Congress’
exercise of its enumerated powers clashes with those individual liberties protected by the Bill of
Rights.83
Preferred Position
The “preferred position” test is similar to the balancing test except that the First
Amendment is presumed to take priority. This test has also been used in many Supreme Court
Cases. In the 1943 case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania, Justice William Douglas wrote that “freedom
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of the press, freedom of speech…are in a preferred position.” 84 Three years later, Justice Hugo
Black wrote in Marsh v. State of Alabama that “in balancing the rights of the people to enjoy
freedom of expression, the Court must remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred
position.”85
Absolutism
In the 1950s Justices Black and Douglas asserted that the First Amendment denied the
government any power to abridge expression. The “absolute test” was designed to enlarge the range
of expression that was protected by the Constitution. In his dissenting opinion in Konigsberg, Black
wrote that “I believe that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that there shall be no
abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of
Rights did all the “balancing” that was to be done in this field.” 86 The absolute test has had few
supporters and the view has never received support from a majority of U. S. Supreme Court
Justices.87 “Copyright 2000, Dollie F. Deaton”

CHAPTER TWO
The Evolution of Libel Laws
But he that flinches from me my good name robs me of that which not enriches him and makes me
poor indeed.
Othello Act III
In its simplest form libel is the publishing or broadcasting of defamatory falsehoods.88
Libel has been a part of our history for generations and much of our early thoughts and ideas about
the subject were inherited from our English ancestors. In our country’s early beginnings publishers
such as James Franklin and John Peter Zenger were charged with seditious libel and jailed for what
they printed. These early publishers fought back and established important principles such as using
truth as a defense. During the times of the Sedition Act of 1798 and the Espionage Acts of 1917 and
1918 the government dealt a heavy hand to those who dared to criticize public officials. These
people had very little if any protection under the First Amendment.
It took almost a century and a half from the time the First Amendment was written to
actually develop rules or principles that would protect the public and the press. The United States
Supreme Court heard several cases that defined these principles for libel. But the case noted for
starting the “libel revolution” is New York Times v. Sullivan in 1964.89 This case developed the
principle or rule known as “actual malice.”
Actual Malice
The case started in 1960 with an advertisement that ran in the New York Times. On
March 29, 1960, the Times ran a full page ad. The purpose was to collect money for the defense of
Dr. Martin Luther King and other people of color who felt they were being treated unfairly because of
their race. Dr. King had been indicted by an Alabama grand jury on the charge of committing perjury
when he signed his 1956 and 1958 state income tax returns.90 This was the first charge of this kind in
Alabama’s judicial history.91 These charges came just two weeks after Dr. King had endorsed a sit-in
that was a response to four black college students not being served at a lunch counter in Greensboro,
North Carolina. The students sat at the lunch counter anyway, and the sit-in movement quickly
spread through the South. Because of his endorsement, Dr. King feared that state officials were intent
on finding some way to put him behind bars.92 Supporters came to his defense to raise money for
legal expenses.
The ad had a headline that read “Heed Their Rising Voices.” The headline was borrowed
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from a Times editorial that ran the previous week.93 The text contained 10 paragraphs and was signed
at the bottom by sixty-four people, including several prominent people, who sponsored the ad.94
Below that was another list that followed the statement: “We in the South who are struggling daily
for dignity and freedom warmly endorse this appeal.” The twenty-four people that signed this were
mostly black ministers in the South. The ad also contained a coupon for readers to send in
contributions for Dr. King’s defense.95
The advertisement stated that nonviolent demonstrations by thousands of Southern black
students seeking “the right to live in human dignity as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and Bill
of Rights” were being “met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would deny and negate
that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for modern freedom.” 96
When the ad ran in the paper, people around the country saw it. At that time The Times
had a circulation of 600,000, of which 394 copies went to readers in Alabama. A few days after the
ad ran, Ray Jenkins, city editor of the Alabama Journal saw it and wrote a story about it. That story
appeared in the April 5, 1960, edition. Jenkins’ story pointed out that there was at least one
misleading fact in the ad. The ad stated that four black students were expelled because they sang
“My Country “Tis of Thee” on the state capitol steps. Actually expulsion resulted from the incident
at Woolworth’s lunch counter in Greensboro, N.C.97
The third paragraph of the ad stated that the student dining hall at Alabama State College
was padlocked when the entire student body refused to re-register as an act of protest against the
expulsion of the students that sang “My Country Tis of Thee” on the state capitol steps.98 The ad
asserted that the padlock of the dining hall “was an attempt to starve the students into submission.
Quite the opposite was true.99 The dining hall had not been padlocked and spring registration was
almost equal to the fall registration.100
Grover Cleveland Hall Jr.,101 editor of The Montgomery Times, wrote an editorial that
stated the ad contained “crude slanders” about the city.102 The next day after this editorial was
printed, City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan wrote The Times and demanded a retraction because he
felt he had been libeled. Sullivan was the commissioner who was in charge of the Montgomery
Police Department.
The Times replied to Sullivan’s letter and asked why he felt that way. The letter pointed
out the ad did not criticize anyone by name. Sullivan stated the charges stated against the police
department would be also make him look bad because he was a police commissioner. He filed a libel
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suit on April 16,1960, in the Montgomery Circuit Court. In addition to The Times, four black
ministers who had paid for the ad were also named as defendants. He asked for damages of
$500,000. John Patterson, governor of Alabama, also filed a lawsuit. In addition to The Times and
the four black ministers, he also named Dr. King as a defendant. He demanded $1 million in
damages.
The mayor of Montgomery, a second commissioner and a former commissioner also filed suits
against The Times. These lawsuits totaled some $3 million in legal claims against the newspaper.103
The Montgomery Circuit Court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded Sullivan the
$500,000 in damages he had asked for. In August 1962, the Alabama Supreme Court upheld the
lower court’s decision. The case then moved to the United States Supreme Court. In 1964 the
decision made by the Alabama Supreme Court was reversed by the Supreme Court.
In writing his opinion, Justice William Brennan said, “the First Amendment represents a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues would be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasant
attacks on government and public officials.”104 Based on that, the Court decided the ad was covered
by the Constitution “as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major issues of our
time.”105
The Court said that the errors in the ad were made honestly and had little bearing on
whether or not the ad received constitutional protection. Justice Brennan wrote, “That erroneous
statement is inevitable in free debate and that it must be protected if freedoms of expression are to
have the breathing space that they need…to survive has been recognized in cases before.” 106 Any
other rule, such as one “compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions--and do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount--leads
to…”self-censorship” of a kind that would blunt criticism of official conduct. As a result, “would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism even though it is believed to
be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear
of the expense of having to do so.”107
Although the material in question was a paid advertisement, it the Court saw it as
material that addressed a major issue during that time. The First Amendment has long recognized
and protected the right of the press to not only cover, but criticize, major issues and acts of the
government without fear of punishment. This “breathing space” that is enjoyed by the press is seen
as an avenue to foster the growth of free speech and not prohibit it. This safety net or breathing press
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simply means that if the press makes an honest mistake it does not have to worry about facing huge
libel suits. The justices made it plain that this breathing space did not include careless errors or
publishing statements to purposely hurt someone’s reputation. If the press is charged with libel,
under the New York Times rule, it must be proven that libel was committed with clear and
convincing clarity.
Perhaps the most important part of the Court’s decision came when the justices agreed
that a statement must be made with actual malice before it can regarded as libel when involving
public officials. The Court said, “A federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that is was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.”108
The words “actual malice” added a new dimension to the First Amendment. Before this
case, if an untrue statement was made about a public official one question was “How much money in
damages was the court going to allow?” The rule of actual malice devised by the Court in 1964
became known as the “New York Times rule.” What actual malice means is that a publisher (editor)
must know that a statement is false before publishing that statement or that the behavior in regard to
journalistic standards constituted reckless disregard for the truth. The ad in Sullivan is a good
example, even if it was a paid advertisement. The New York Times did not know that the ad
contained false information when it was printed. Therefore, it could not be said the paper acted with
disregard for the truth. If it had been known that the statements were false and the ad had been
printed to hurt Sullivan’s reputation, then it have constituted “reckless disregard.”
Giving First Amendment protection to a publisher who printed something that was not
true would have seemed impossible to people like James Franklin or John Peter Zenger. These men
were jailed for printing the truth. In the New York Times case, the Court acknowledged that
publishers are human and humans make mistakes.109 By acknowledging that editors are human and
will sometimes make mistakes, this gave the press a “breathing space” and showed a tolerance for
errors that are made honestly.110
But when mistakes are done purposely to harm a public official or “with reckless
disregard for the truth,” there is no longer First Amendment protection. This case placed libel
squarely in the First Amendment arena and opened up a whole new avenue in First Amendment
rights. Not only did this decision consider written works, but also the publishers state of mind. Until
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now a publisher’s state of mind had not been questioned. Over the next several years Supreme Court
Justices ruled on several cases that allowed the Court to further develop principles regarding libel
and public figures. Rules were carved out to determine who was a public figure and who was not
and how to determine the difference between the two. The next case to challenge the Court in the
area of libel occurred just three years after the landmark decision made in The New York Times suit.
In the case involving Wally Butts,111 justices applied the New York Times rule and stated that
“malice must be demonstrated with convincing clarity.” This case and one involving a retired
military general 112 set the standards for the definition of public figure.
Public Figure
Butts, the University of Georgia athletic director, was accused of conspiring to fix a 1962
football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama. The article
appeared in the Saturday Evening Post on March 13, 1963. The article stated its source as being a
salesman that attended the game. This salesman accidentally heard a conversation between the two
coaches when his phone somehow became hooked into a long distance circuit carrying the
conversation between Butts and Paul Bryant.
After the article was published, Butts filed suit against the Curtis Publishing Company
that owned the Saturday Evening Post. He was awarded $60,000 in general damages and $3 million
in punitive damages. The punitive damages were later reduced to $460,000 by the trial judge.113
Butts was paid by a private athletic association and not by the state and did not fall into
the category of being a public official. The Curtis Publishing Company made a motion for a new trial
on the grounds that Butts was not a public official and therefore the New York Times rule did not
apply. The motion was rejected by the trial judge. He also said that “there was ample evidence from
which a jury could have concluded that there was reckless disregard by defendant of whether or not
the article was false or not.”114 The court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment by a
2-1 vote, writing that “what the Post did was done with reckless disregard of whether the article was
false or not.”115
In a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and
allowed Butts to keep the $460,000 awarded in punitive damages. In writing the court’s opinion,
Justice John Marshall Harlan added a new dimension, that of a public figure. Harlan wrote, “We
consider and would hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages
for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a
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showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.116
Although the outcome was a little different, another case that was decided the same day
as Butts’ can be compared and contrasted. This case involved Edwin Walker, a retired Army Major
General.117 A news article written by the Associated Press stated that Walker had personally led a
demonstration against federal marshals who were attempting to enforce integration at the University
of Mississippi. Walker sued for damages and was awarded $800,000. The Court reversed that
decision holding the trial court could only find ordinary negligence.
Neither Butts or Walker could be labeled as a public official. Walker was a civilian at the
time of the riots. Butts was paid by a private athletic organization and not by the university. He
could not meet the public official criteria either. Because of this, the Court created a new category,
public figure. The Court ruled that public figures, as well as public officials, must meet the actual
malice test.
There were only a few years between The New York Times case and Walker and Butts.
Within this time the Supreme Court made great leaps in providing national rules for libel and what
could be protected by the First Amendment. The next important case, considered to be the high
water mark, came just four years after Butts and Walker had their day in court. It extended the actual
malice test further.
Private Persons and Private Figures
In 1971 the Court extended actual malice to the private persons. In Rosenblum v.
Metromedia, Inc., Justice William Brennan wrote a plurality opinion that would place all individuals
within the New York Times rule, if they were involved in a public event of general interest.118
A distributor of nudist magazines, George Rosenbloom, and about 20 news stand
operators were arrested and charged with selling obscene material. He was released on bail, but
arrested a second time following seizure of obscene materials from his home and a rented barn. The
arrests were broadcast over Metromedia’s WIP radio station in Philadelphia. The station’s
newscaster described him as a “smut peddler.” Rosenbloom filed a libel suit against WIP and
several other media organizations. He also asked for an injunction against the police that would stop
them from interfering with his distributions.
When broadcasting the news about the forthcoming trial, WIP newscasters used the
words “smut” and “filth” in describing the material that had been distributed by Rosenbloom. The
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newscast did not mention him by name. After being acquitted of obscenity charges, he filed a libel
suit against WIP in federal court. He stated that he had been defamed because he had been called a
“smut peddler” and that was not true because he had been found not guilty. The jury awarded
$25,000 in general damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. The district court reduced the
punitive damages to $250,000.119
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the lower court’s
decision, noting that broadcasts were about matters of public interest and that they involved “hot
news” prepared under deadline pressure.120 The Court of Appeals concluded that “the fact that
plaintiff was not a public figure cannot be accorded decisive importance if the recognized important
guarantees of the First Amendment are to be adequately implemented.121 For that reason, it held that
the New York Times actual malice standard did apply to the case, and because Rosenbloom had failed
to show reckless disregard, it rendered a judgment for Metromedia.122
In a plurality opinion the Supreme Court, by a 5-3 voted, upheld the Court of Appeals
decision. Justice William Breman’s lead opinion, joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and
Justice Harry Blackmun, reasoned that the Constitution “places in private hands vast areas of
economic and social power that vitally affect the nature and quality of life in the Nation.” 123
Freedom of speech and press are not limited to political expression but embrace “all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period.” Justice Brennan quoted the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren
in Curtis Publishing Company, which stated that the distinction between the governmental and
private sectors are blurred and that individuals who do not hold public office are “nevertheless
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions.”124
Both Warren and Brennan recognized that some people who do not hold public office or
are not celebrities can still have ready access to the media. Because of this easy access, public
figures have more power to influence and respond to criticism. A lawyer and a factory worker are
two examples of private figures and private individuals. The lawyer would receive more attention in
the press if he were criticized for not doing his job, than a factory worker who did not do good work.
In just seven years, 1964 to 1971, the Supreme Court had taken libel from tort law and
given it constitutional protection under the First Amendment. A test, called actual malice, was
devised and used as the standard in libel cases. New categories within libel, such as public official
and private figure, had been created. The Court extended the boundaries further when it ruled that
when a private
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individual was caught up in a public matter, that individual must meet the same standard of liability
as a public figure or official would have to. Libel was definitely on a fast tract of reaching new
boundaries.
Then something happened. Libel took off in a whole new direction. Just a couple of
years later, a decision was made that reversed many of the gains made by the media since New York
Times v. Sullivan. States could set their own standards for determining liability against a person that
was classified as a private figure. Most states adopted a “minimal level” of fault where the private
figure must prove only that the publisher/reporter acted negligently in reporting facts. This is a far
cry from the actual malice standard. It is much easier to prove negligence than actual malice.
Proving negligence is proving a careless act, but with actual malice the publisher’s state of mind
must also be considered.
Private Person
The private person was an attorney, Elmer Gertz. He was a practicing attorney, and the
author of several books. He was active in writing the Illinois constitution and he was able to get a
death sentence commutation for Jack Ruby. Ruby had been convicted of killing Lee Harvy Oswald,
the man who allegedly shot President John F. Kennedy.125
Gertz was hired by a family whose child had been killed by a police officer. The incident
happened in Chicago. An article in American Opinion portrayed Gertz as a member of the “Marxist
League for Industrial Democracy…” 126 The article also stated that he had been an officer of the
National Lawyers Guild, described as a Communist organization that “probably did more than any
other outfit to plan the Communist attack on Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic
Convention.127
Gertz filed a libel suit against Robert Welch, publisher of the magazine. He claimed the
falsehoods printed in the magazine hurt his reputation. Welch countered with a pretrial motion for
summary judgment. He asserted that Gertz was a public figure and that the article was about an
issue of public importance. For those reasons he argued the actual malice principle applied. He also
asserted that Gertz could not show there was actual malice or reckless disregard.
The jury awarded $50,000 to Gertz.128 The trial judge then reversed the verdict.129 He
ruled that Gertz was not a public figure. The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
judge’s decision. However, there was doubt expressed regarding the ruling that Gertz was not a
public figure. The Court of Appeals also asserted that Gertz had failed to prove that those who wrote
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the article knew of the falsity of the accusations.130 In other words, Gertz failed the actual malice
test.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision. The
majority opinion was written by Justice Lewis Powell and joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist. This controversial decision reversed many gains made by the media since
The New York Times v. Sullivan case and altered the libel laws nationwide. The question, according
to Justice Powell, was should a person who is neither a public official or public figure have to meet
the actual malice test. This question was in direct conflict with the Rosenbloom decision made just
three year earlier that stated “if a private person was thrust in a public matter that person must meet
the actual malice standard.”
In his opinion, Justice Powell attempted to delineate the “common ground” among the
justices on First Amendment matters.131 First he wrote, there is no such thing as a false idea, finding
that the Constitution relies on an idea’s acceptability in the public mind, not in the courts, to
determine its merit. False facts are in themselves unworthy of constitutional protection, the Court
wrote, yet punishing a publication for printing such falsehoods runs the risk of inducing a cautious
and restrictive exercise of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and press.132
Powell acknowledged that use of the New York Times test would defeat the claims of
many deserving plaintiffs, including some intentionally subjected to injury,133 but found this to be a
price the Constitution considers worth paying with respect to public officials and public figures.
“The First Amendment,” he said, “requires us to protect falsehood in order to protect speech that
matters.” 134
Different considerations enter into the constitutional equation when the person libeled is a
private individual, the Court stated.135 If the issue is one of public or general interest, use of the New
York Times standard is too high, the court decided, for someone who is not a public figure or public
official and whose exposure to the increased risk of published falsehood is thus not voluntary.
Moreover, a person who is not a public official or figure, the Court suggested, has a lesser ability to
command media attention to expose a falsehood.136
The Gertz decision split the public figure classification into two different categories, an
all purpose public figure and a limited purpose figure.137 The all purpose figure was one whose
pervasive fame or notoriety is such that they are deemed public figures for all purposes and in all
contexts.138 The limited purpose public figure was one who either put themselves or became caught
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up in a controversy that made them a public figure because they invite attention and comment.139
The Court also granted power to the states to set their own standards of liability for a
publisher of defamatory untruths against person who is considered to be a private individual. Most
of the states have chosen to adopt a negligence standard, a minimal level of fault that means simply
that a private figure who is sued for libel must prove that the publisher acted negligently, failing to
report and write with the care a reasonable journalist would have.140 Acting negligently is different
from actual malice. Acting negligently is acting carelessly, but not on purpose to damage to
someone. With actual malice, there is forethought to do damage or harm to a person’s reputation.
The Court ruled that people considered to be public officials or all purpose public figures
had to meet the actual malice test before recovering damages from a media defendant, unless the
untrue statements were not related to public performance. That was extended further when it ruled
that a libel plaintiff had to meet the actual malice standards in order to recover punitive damages.
Jurors could no longer presume that damages had occurred just because libelous materials had been
printed by the press or broadcast. With this ruling, some evidence of actual harm had to be presented.
Prior to this ruling, damages were presumed when publication took place. Large sums of money
were awarded to people without any actual proof of damages.
The court also addressed the issue of the private individual and damages that can occur.
A private individual does not command the same attention as a public figure, and therefore does not
have the ability to attract the press when a libelous statement is made. Punitive damages to private
people are awarded on the grounds of actual damages, not presumed damages, to a person’s
reputation.
Justice Byron White wrote a blistering 35 page dissenting opinion. He was unhappy with
the level of fault in Justice Powell’s opinion. He sharply criticized what he considered to be the
Court’s efforts in Gertz to unsurp the responsibility of states to determine the rights of an ordinary
citizen to recover damages for false publication injurious to the person’s reputation.141 He wrote,
“The Court in a few printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring
unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most of the 50 states.
That result is accomplished by requiring the plaintiff in each and every defamation action to prove
not only the defendant’s culpability beyond his act of publishing defamatory material but also actual
damages to reputation resulting from the publication.”142
He speculated that “these sweeping changes will be popular with the press, but this is not
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the road to salvation for a court of law.”143 While agreeing that in a democratic society such as ours
the citizen has the privilege of criticizing his government, White stated the First Amendment still
does not deprive the private citizen of his historic recourse to redress published falsehoods damaging
to reputation.144
Justice Brennan joined White in dissent. Brennan wrote the opinion in the New York
Times case and the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. In his opinion, he stated that a public issue or
pubic event was no less important to a democratic society and to First Amendment issues than a
public official or public figure. He added that a private figure could be thrown involuntarily into
pubic events is the price of a free society and makes the event no less public.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, though he sensed “some illogic” in its
refusal to extend the actual malice standard to events of public or general interest.145 Although he
stated that had his vote not been necessary to complete the majority he would have voted otherwise,
Blackmum stressed that this decision would provide some measure of certainty in the law of libel
and, most important, would remove “the specters of presumed and punitive damages” from
publishers.146
There are several important outcomes from the Gertz decision, one being that Justice
Blackmum only voted for the decision because it was necessary to complete the majority. This is a
weak reason to vote a particular way. He also stated “some illogic” in the refusal of the actual
malice test. The controversial decision made in the Gertz case overruled the decisions made in
Rosenbloom.
With this ruling, the private individual (defendant) had to show proof they had been
libeled in order to win a judgment. This makes the plaintiff responsible for the burden of proof in
libelous situations. Plaintiffs now have to prove not only were the statements made about them were
untrue, but also that these statements were published with an element of falsehood. New
definitions, all purpose figure and limited purpose figure, were used to restrict the type of individuals
that could be considered public figures.
This gave private figures a better opportunity to vindicate themselves when they felt they
had been libeled. The states were granted the power to set standards for libel. This allowed lower
courts to extend First Amendment protection further than what had previously been granted.
The definition of public figure developed in Gertz was applied just two years later when
a prominent socialite, Mary Alice Firestone, was determined to be a private figure. Time, Inc. v.
Firestone147 reduced even further the categories of those who could be considered public figures.
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Firestone was prominent in Palm Beach. She sued Time for an article that had stated her husband
had divorced her on grounds of extreme cruelty and adultery.148
Despite the fact she held press conferences during the divorce proceedings, and thus had
access to the press, the Court deemed her to be a private figure whose participation in divorce did not
voluntarily thrust her into the public eye or give her special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.149 As in Gertz, the Court was badly divided. The 5-3 decision took another step
backwards from Rosenbloom and narrowed the definition of public figure even more. It also sent a
warning to the media that even an innocent mistake could be severely punished.
In his opinion, Justice William Rehnquist stated that Firestone was not a public figure
because, “Respondent did not assume any role of prominence in the affairs of society, other than
perhaps the Palm Beach society, and she did not thrust herself to the forefront of any particular
public controversy in order to influence the resolution of issues involved in it. Petitioner contends
that because the Firestone divorce was characterized by the Florida Supreme Court as a “cause
celebre it must have been a public controversy and respondent must be considered a public figure.”
“But in doing so petitioner seeks to equate “public controversy with all controversies of interest to
the public.”150
Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that Firestone did fit the definition of a public figure.
He stated that “Mrs. Firestone brought suit for separate maintenance with reason to know of the
likely public interest in the proceedings…The 27-month trial and related events attracted national
news coverage, and elicited no fewer than 43 articles in the Miami Herald and 45 articles in the
Palm Beach Post and Palm Beach Times. Far from shunning publicity, Mrs. Firestone held several
press conferences in the course of the proceedings.”151
The majority decided that a divorce proceeding did not fit the definition of public
controversy that was established in Gertz. By having the power to define what a public controversy
was also gave the Court the ability to determine whether or not the plaintiff was a public figure or
private one. Once that determination is made, the next question is what tests of actual malice apply
and how much First Amendment protection does the Constitution allow to this individual and where
does the burden of proof lie.
Over the last few decades magazines such as The National Enquirer and The Star have
built up a large audience nationwide. Magazines such as these target the lives of the “Rich and
Famous,” package it up in newsy articles and are sold in just about every grocery, gas and even
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department stores nation wide. Sometimes these magazines write outlandish stories and sometimes
the people whom they are written about fight back in court.
Actress Shirley Jones sued the National Enquirer when it published an article that said
she was too drunk to work on a television series. She also sued an Enquirer editor and reporter as
individuals. The magazine did not mind going to court in California, even though it was based in
Florida. The editor and reporter were another story. They did not think they should be involved at
all, let alone have to be in a California court. The Court ruled the case had to be defended in
California because Jones resided there and the magazine was sold there. She settled out of court for
an undisclosed amount and the magazine had to write a retraction on the article.
Libel and the protection from being libeled has been challenged many times even in the
last half century. The Court has set down rules and through a rigorous process of deciding different
cases, it has defined and redefined what constitutes libel and what can be done if libel is proven.
These cases have also given the media a road map to follow and have shown that there can be severe
penalties when they do not follow them. Now there is a new medium on the rise. This medium, the
Internet, comes complete with easy access and many questions that the Court will have to deal with.
“Copyright 2000, Dollie F. Deaton”

CHAPTER THREE
The Invasion of the Internet
We live in a most extraordinary age. Events so various and so important that might crowd and
distinguish centuries, are, in our times, compressed within the compass of a single life.
Daniel Webster, 1825
Although these words were written almost two centuries ago, they still describe the fast
paced life in which most people live. The word “extraordinary” may not even begin to describe the
trips to outer space and the inventions that made these trips possible. It is doubtful that Webster
imagined someone on Earth talking to someone on the Moon, let alone the whole world watching a
man walk on the moon’s surface.
Our ways of communication have evolved rapidly. First the telegraph, radio and the
telephone enabled people who could afford them an effective and fast way of receiving and sending
communications. In the 1940’s and 50’s television added pictures to the sound and people were able
to see and hear news and entertainment on a daily basis. News shows were usually broadcast once or
twice a day.
But in the last decade a new form of communication, the Internet, burst onto the scene. It
was a fast growing trend that offered easy and instant access. All that was needed to get on-line was
a computer. At first getting on-line was a bit more complicated and expensive than today. Over the
past 20 years computer companies have worked to make their products as “computer friendly” and
affordable as possible. Schools have started teaching children as early as age five the basics of
computer programming. Colleges offer a multitude of courses dealing with computers and the
Internet. Getting on the Internet is as easy as point and click.
How many people are on-line in America or throughout the world is probably only a good
guess. There are many surveys that use all types of parameters trying to answer this question. A
March 2000 survey published by Neu Internet Surveys estimated there were 304.36 million world
wide, with 136.86 million in Canada and the United States.152
Europe was second with 83.25 million users,153 Asia/Pacific had 68.9 million,154 South
America had 10.74 million,155 Africa had 2.58 million156 and the Middle East was last with 1.90
million users.157
It’s hard to believe that this amazing new super highway of information began
with just some thoughts and ideas bouncing around in the heads of such people as J. C. R. Licklider,
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Len Kleinrock, and Tim Berners-Lee. Licklider and Kleinrock were graduates of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Berners-Lee was educated in England.
In August 1962 Licklider began discussing his “Galactic Network” concept at MIT. He
envisioned a globally interconnected set of computers through which everyone could quickly access
data and programs from any site.158 His concept was similar to what our Internet is today.
At the same time, Kleinrock was at MIT doing Ph.D. research. Unlike many of his
colleagues, he chose to do his research in a virtually unknown area called data networks. In 1959 he
submitted a Ph.D. proposal to study data networks, thus launching technology which eventually led
to the Internet.159 His research was published in McGraw-Hill. The book, “Communication Nets”
provided the basic principles for today’s Internet technology.160
Both MIT researchers joined forces when they became employed by the Federal
Government at the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPANET). In September 1969, the first
host computer was connected so that messages could be sent and routed in many different directions.
This was just the beginning. Over the next few years, many more computers were added to the
ARPANET.
Berners-Lee took the research and new technology a step further. In 1989 he proposed a
global hypertext project to be known as the World Wide Web.161 This global network was designed
to allow people to work together by combining their knowledge in a web of hypertext documents.162
In October 1990, he began working on his project and in just two short months the World Wide Web
was made available to some of Berners-Lee’s colleagues. The following summer WWW, as it has
became known, hit the Internet.
For the next two years Berners-Lee continued to refine his work on the World Wide Web.
Today WWW and the Internet are interchangeable. The technology that started with visions and
ideas are used by millions. The result is a decentralized, global network—or cyberspace—that links
people, institutions, corporations, and governments around the world.163
The Need For Rules
The Internet is unique in that it is neither a print nor an electronic medium, but a
combination of both. Information can be transmitted or received instantly with the simple click of a
mouse. People of all ages can communicate with e-mail, instant messenger or by getting into a chat
room. It costs nothing to e-mail someone across the country as compared to several dollars that
could be spent talking on the phone. There is also a great deal of freedom with this type of
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communication. Written words do not make a sound and the sender can say what they wish or send
any kind of picture to another terminal with the clip of a mouse.
In addition to communication, the Internet is also the newest shopping market.
Everything from prescription drugs to airline tickets can be bought on-line. It would probably be
impossible to find a major or even small corporation that does not have at least one web site. These
web sites usually contain a guest book for people to sign and at least one place to leave messages.
The Internet probably offers more freedom for sending or receiving messages than other
type of medium. However too much of anything is not good. There must be rules to guide the
“driver on this information highway.” However, this new frontier is so much different that the
traditional media that it is unclear if traditional rules are applicable. The mere fact that there are no
physical boundaries to this new frontier is a good example of the differences between the Internet
and more traditional modes of communication. Because of the abundance of freedom and the lack of
rules in the “cyberspace community,” it didn’t take long for problems to arise. Some indecent
pictures and other types of pornography became commonplace on the Internet. There was a growing
concern because of the easy access children had. Outraged parents began to speak out and demand
the issue be addressed.
President Clinton’s administration rose to the occasion and approved The
Communication Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). At the same time other countries were addressing the
issue of indecent materials over this new information highway. In September 1996, the
Telecommunications Council of the European Union adopted a resolution to prevent sending
indecent materials, especially child pornography.
The Communication Decency Act
The CDA was an addition to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Addressed in this bill
was Internet pornography and the easy access children have to it. The law was put into place on
February 8, 1996. This section made it a criminal act to knowingly send pornography or indecent
material on the Internet to a minor. People found guilty of this crime would be subject to a $250,000
fine and a two-year imprisonment.
Senator James Exon (D-Nebraska) introduced the bill which was passed by both houses
of Congress by a vote of 415-16. Exon told members of Congress that people would be arrested if
they were giving pornography to children, displaying it on street lights or inviting children into
adult bookstores. He argued that exposing children to such things on the Internet was no different
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and that strict laws were needed to protect minors from Internet pornography. Exon could compare
the Internet to a bookstore because of findings from an earlier case, Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy
Services Co.164 In this suit part of Prodigy’s defense was that the it was similar to a bookstore.
The Stratton Oakmont case started in October 1994 when an anonymous user posted an
anonymous message on a Prodigy bulletin board. The message among other things called the
brokerage firm’s president, David Porush, a soon to be proven criminal.165 These defamatory
messages continued for two weeks and Porush eventually heard about them. A libel suit was filed
against Prodigy for being a provider of defamatory speech.
New York Supreme Court Justice Stuart Ain ruled in favor of Stratton Oakmont and held
that Prodigy was a publisher and not a distributor.166 Because Prodigy used some type of software to
prescreen pornography and racial remarks, Ain ruled that Prodigy was using editorial control and
could be sued as a publisher. Prodigy settled out of court.
Because of this libel suit, a “good Samaritan” clause was put into the CDA. It stated that
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider and no provider or user can be
held liable for any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
objectionable content.”167 This clause is also known as Section 230.
The CDA created immediate controversy over freedom of speech and government
regulation of the Internet. Groups against the measure included publishers, librarians and civil
liberties groups. They argued that the CDA severely restricted First Amendment rights guaranteed
by the First Amendment and that it might threaten the actual existence of the Internet. Groups that
supported the CDA included many Christian and pro-family organizations. They argued that
cyberporn with its easy accessibility was a threat to minors and there was a great need to control it.
Within days after the bill was signed, several lawsuits were filed against it. A complaint
filed by the Consumer Internet Empowerment Coalition (CIEC) requested a temporary injunction be
granted to stop the enactment of the CDA. A similar suit was filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and resulted in a
temporary restraining order against the CDA. The order granted by Judge Ronald Buckwalter stated
that the indecency provision of the CDA was unconstitutionally vague.
At that point a three judge court agreed to meet and review the law. Serving on this
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court was Chief Judge Dolores Sloviter, Chief Judge for the Third Court of Appeals, Judge
Buckwalter and Judge Stewart Dalzell. Eventually similar suits filed against the CDA became
consolidated and were heard as one suit by the three judge court.168 In June 1996 the three judge
court ruled that the CDA would unconstitutionally restrict free speech on the Internet.
The following month another suit was filed in New York to stop the enforcement of the
CDA.169 This verdict was also rendered by a three-judge court. The panel consisted of Judge Jose
Cabranes of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, and two federal district judges, Leonard Sand and
Denise Cote. The ruling stated they did not find the CDA language overbroad as a “Ban on
constitutionally protected indecent communication between adults but that the CDA would chill
protected speech between adults.”170
The Clinton administration appealed the decisions made in New York and Philadelphia. In July
1996 the Department of Justice filed an appeal against the Philadelphia Court’s decision. In
December the Supreme Court said it would hear the government’s case. Formal proceedings started
in March 1997. This case, considered to be a landmark decision, is Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union.171
Reno v. ACLU
In July 1997, the Supreme Court handed down a ruling that opposed just about every
argument made in favor of the CDA. This ruling gave First Amendment protection to Internet
speech. The 40 page opinion was written by Chief Justice John Paul Stevens and signed by all nine
justices. A separate dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice
Sandra Day O’Conner..
The majority opinion said the CDA placed undue barriers on adult communications and
that its blanket prohibitions on indecent and patently offensive online content were overbroad.172
The Court acknowledged that protecting children from indecent material was certainly a legitimate
cause, but felt the CDA had gone overboard in trying to do so. The Court said the government
simply can’t force the adult population to go by only what is appropriate for minors.173
Another problem the justices cited was that the language contained in the CDA was
vague. The Court found that “the CDA’s statutory terms relating to indecent communications and
material raised certain First Amendment issues such a chilling effect on free speech was of special
concern. Also rejected was the CDA’s concept of indecency as it was applied to the Internet. The
Court stated, “We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires
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when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful
speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional
right to receive and to address to one another.”174
The Court also rejected the government’s opinion that its “significant interest in fostering
the Internet’s growth provides an independent basis for upholding the CDA’s constitutionally.”175
Proponents of the CDA argued that the Internet’s growth would be diminished by parent’s fears of
what their children might see and find on the Internet if they did not have a way to protect them from
indecent materials. Justice Stevens noted that “the dramatic expansion of this new marketplace of
ideas contradicts the factual basis of this contention.”176
Rejected by the Court was the defense’s attempt to use the three prong test for obscenity
that was developed in Miller v. California.177 The case involved Marvin Miller who was convicted of
distributing advertisements that contained sexually explicit materials. The three prong test redefined
community, retained the patently offensive standard and gave specific examples of what was
considered to be patently offensive. The government attempted to argue that the CDA’s terminology
patently offensive and indecency fit one part of the three part test and therefore could not be
considered vague.
In his opinion Justice Stevens noted two concerns about the vagueness of the CDA. He
noted “The vagueness of the (Communications Decency Act) is a matter of special concern for two
reason. First, the (act) is a content based regulation of speech. The vagueness of such a regulation
raises special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech.
Second, the Communications Decency Act is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and
stigma of a criminal conviction, the Communications Decency Act threatens violators with penalties
including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The severity of criminal sanctions even
arguably unlawful words, ideals, and images.”178
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Conner argued that the
CDA could constitutionally apply to some things. They made references to an “adult zone” and
creating appropriate and constitutional zoning laws to protect minors from indecent material. Justice
Day O’Conner noted that two characteristics of the physical world which made adult zones a
workable approach to limiting access to sexually explicit material were geography and identity.179
The decision made by the Supreme Court in1997 was widely applauded by the millions of
Internet users. In just a few short years after the “birth” of the Internet, this medium received full
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First Amendment protection. It’s interesting to note that traditional media, such as newspapers, took
years and many law suits before it received this honored protection. In declaring the CDA
unconstitutional, the Court clearly demonstrated its belief in the marketplace of ideas and this
decision squarely put this new media in the midst of it.
Reno v. ACLU was the first attempt made to govern this new “cyberspace frontier.” Since
then there have been many questions as to what types of other rules or standards that should be used
to govern this new territory. Do the old standards, such as the New York Times rule, that have been
tried and proved apply to this new technology? Or is this frontier so different that a whole new set of
rules should be made? Can a part of the Constitution that was written two centuries ago be made to
govern a whole new realm that was totally unimaginable even 40 years ago?
No one seems to know for sure what rules apply. However, all Internet users agree there
should be some type of rules or laws for travelers on this new information highway. The answers to
these types of questions can only come in time and will probably be the result of some type of
lawsuit. Currently, there are several cyberspace libel suits filed.
The standards and rulings made by the courts will determine what laws will govern the
Internet. Because this technology is new and different, some believe the First Amendment in its
current form must change. There are those who contend the First Amendment is flexible enough and
changing the rules and laws that have been set down over the last two centuries will only do more
harm than good.
The remainder of this chapter will describe four tests that have been used by the courts in
deciding First Amendment issues. By applying standards that have been used in the past, the Court
is answering the question as to whether the First Amendment can govern this new frontier without
changing.
Strict Scrutiny Test
This type of test is used when there are questions about restrictions on the contents of
such things as newspapers, pamphlets, and public speeches. It was also used in suits involving
telephone communications that were considered to be indecent but not legally obscene.180 When
using the strict scrutiny test, a court must decide whether the regulation in question promotes a
compelling state/government interest and whether it constitutes the least restrictive means to further
that interest.181
This standard was first used in the 1968 free speech case of the United States v.
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O’Brien.182 In Boston, David O’Brien and three other men burned their draft cards on the
courthouse steps in protest of the Vietnam War. O’Brien was convicted by the U.S District Court in
Massachusetts. He argued that burning his draft card was an act of symbolic speech protected by the
First Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals agreed, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Chief
Justice Earl Warren wrote, “This Court has held that when speech and non speech elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the non speech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”183
Stating that the government could impose restrictions on free speech if it was proven the
government had a compelling interest was not a popular decision. The decision came at a time when
there were daily protests against the Vietnam War. The Court said that the “compelling interest”
was the draft. At that time, this was the system used to build the armed forces and burning a draft
card was considered a definite violation of that interest. Today the draft no longer exists. If someone
burned a draft card and was taken to court the case probably would not survive the strict scrutiny test
of compelling interest.
Part of O’Brien’s defense was that he was trying to gain or influence other people’s
opinion. The Court ruled that actions such as these must follow the least restrictive method of
portraying a person’s attitude or actions. O’Brien failed to show this was the least restrictive way of
displaying his attitude. Instead of burning his draft card, perhaps he should have marched in a
demonstration with thousands of other people that used this method to voice their opinions during
that time.
The decision made by the Court may have not been the most popular, but it has been used
many times over since then. In 1997 the Court used the strict scrutiny analysis to decide Reno v.
ACLU. In this case the government failed to prove that without the CDA a sexually hostile
environment would exist and that adults or minors would have a problem getting access to obscene
materials on the Internet. There was no problem in proving the Court had a compelling interest in
protecting minors from obscenity. The problem was in determining what the definition of obscenity
and how much or how little of this type material was actually harmful to minors, if the actual age of
the Internet user could be proven. Again, the language in the CDA was just too vague to withstand
the strict scrutiny test.
The CDA was not proven to be the least restrictive method of controlling indecent
material on the Internet. At the same time it was protecting minors, the law was placing a burden
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on adult communication. Also, the law could not protect minors from obscene material that was
sent from another country. Another problem with on-line materials is that it is very difficult to
determine who the sender is, even if that sender is in the United States.
The strict scrutiny analysis is similar to the balancing test that was developed by Chief
Justice Fred Vinson in 1951.It could be argued that the Court “balanced” the rights of adults to send
adult materials on-line against the rights of minors that might accidentally or otherwise see this
material. In this case adult rights had the priority over the rights of minors. Because of the vagueness
of the CDA, the Court would have had a difficult time ruling in favor of the rights of minors over the
rights of adults. This prioritizing of adult rights over minors did not mean that the Court was not
concerned about what minors could view.
This standard also requires a “reconciliation or resolution” of the issues that are being
debated. It could be said that the reconciliation was that adults had the right to send adult or
otherwise materials on-line and the president encouraged parents to monitor what their children were
viewing via a computer screen.
Although the balancing test was not mentioned in reaching this landmark decision, it is
easy to see how the concepts that make up this test could have been used. There were competing
rights involved, and these rights were weighed heavily against each other to determine which one
had priority over the other. Once this was done the Court and the presidential administration made a
reconciliation of the issues.
The strict scrutiny analysis was applied. This test is about 30 years old but the court was
able to use it to settle First Amendment issues in Reno v. ACLU. The decision did not make
everyone happy, but in court cases usually only one side feel justice has been done. In this case, the
winners were those who favored giving full First Amendment protection to the Internet. By using
this tried and true method, the Court proved the First Amendment can be used to control this new
territory known as cyberspace when the government can prove it has a compelling interest.
What would happen if there was a suit in which the government could not prove or did
not have a compelling interest on the part of the government? In these types cases another standard,
such as the “rational basis test”, would have to be used.
The Rational Basis Test
The rational basis test states that government restriction of speech is constitutional if it
can be proven there is a “rational basis” for the restriction. In other words, this method is exactly
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opposite the strict scrutiny test. This standard puts emphasis on “conjectural harm” or what harm
“might” be caused by viewing or reading obscene materials. The strict scrutiny test, on the other
hand, looks at what actual harm was caused rather than what might have been caused.
Usually this standard is not used to make judgments on the limitations placed on speech.
It has been used for speech issues that do not have First Amendment protection. If the Court had
chosen to use this method instead of strict scrutiny, the CDA would have been deemed
constitutional. The rational basis would have been protecting minors from obscene materials that
come via Internet.
Courts have used the rational basis test as early as 1968 in Ginsberg v. New York. Sam
Ginsburg, the owner of a Long Island diner, sold two “girlie” magazines to a 16-year-old boy. He
was charged with selling obscene materials to minors. The Court ruling made it a crime to knowingly
sell a minor obscene materials such as nude pictures. In this case, the Court ruled that the rational
basis test deemed “only that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.184
This standard was used again in Paris Adult Theatre 1 v. Slaton (1973) .185 An adult
theater in Georgia was showing two movies that contained adult material. The owners and managers
were prosecuted because of the harm that might be caused by viewing this type of material. In turn,
the theater owners contended the film was covered by the First Amendment and should be allowed to
continue showing this type of film.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s ruling that these movies were obscene and
were not covered by the First Amendment and that in this instance movie theaters did not have
constitutional protection. They also ruled that exposure to this type of material might cause harm to
minors. This statement was not made on fact, but merely conjecture. The Court had no concrete
proof that actual harm was being caused by exposure to adult movies.
There is a growing concern about what harm is being caused by the material minors view
on the Internet. This items range from pornography to how to make bombs. The Court has never
denied that harm could result from people seeing or reading these types of materials. In fact, there is
proof that certain things found on the Internet, such a how to make a bomb, can be harmful.
The problem with conjectural harm is that no crime has been committed and until harm
occurs, no one usually makes any noise. This noise gets people’s attention and gets laws passed to
stop the harm from occurring again.. Also, authors of many items on the Internet are just as vague as
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the CDA language itself. It’s hard to prosecute someone that has no face or physical residence that
can be tracked down.
The Broadcast Standard
The Internet is quite similar to broadcast in that the signal travels on airwaves or
cyberspace making the broadcast standard a very good rule to use in the regulation of this new
frontier. The Internet is also similar to broadcasting because it is very accessible to young children
and it can be done in the complete privacy of a bedroom, basement or on a mountain top. A person
can be listening to the radio and suddenly hear something that offends them. This can happen
without any warning at all.
At the same time, a person can be “surfing the net” and a message will suddenly appear
without any warning The file can be almost anything from a nice thank you card to a nude picture.
The listener/user has no way of knowing what the message is until it is either heard or opened. The
difference between the two is that the listener can not turn off the radio before something considered
indecent is said. The surfer on the net doesn’t have to open a message. “Turning one’s head or
looking the other way” may be the least restrictive alternative to indecent material.”186 However,
files can come with some very unassuming titles. When indecent material is thrust upon someone
applying the broadcast standard would work well in dealing with cyberspace issues because of the
similarities with the broadcast medium.
This standard evolved from a case that started in 1973 and ended in 1978. FCC v.
Pacifica, “the seven dirty words” case challenged the government’s burden of justification
concerning the regulation of indecent expression on the airwaves. Until that case the government
had a lower burden of justification. This case gave the courts greater power to punish indecent
materials that were broadcast. The case started when a father complained to the Federal
Communications Commission about some “indecent words” there were broadcast at 2 p.m. The
father was upset because he had his son in the car and the son was subjected to the indecent material.
The FCC ruled that the language in the monologue was indecent, not obscene, but should
not have been broadcast at 2 p.m. because of the accessibility of minors to the broadcast media. The
U. S. Court of Appeals in Washington D.C. overturned this ruling and the case went on to the
Supreme Court. In a 5-4 opinion Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that it was not unconstitutional for
the FCC to prohibit language that was considered indecent. The ruling held that the listener’s rights
take priority over the media’s rights if the listener can be subjected to indecent or offensive
communication without warning.
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The FCC has set a standard that created an adult zone in the broadcasting medium.
Television and radio broadcasts that contain adult material or language are supposed to be broadcast
later in the evening. Cable television offers parents the option of blocking certain channels that
parents do not want their minor children to view. Software companies are working to create
software that will serve the same purpose. However, at this time there is no software that will
guarantee that all indecent sites can be blocked by parents.187
The Denver Area Standard
Denver Area v. FCC, 188developed in 1996, applies to the cable television medium. If this
standard were applied to the Internet, individual service providers would have the right to edit or
remove any message or picture that appeared on-line. If this standard were applied to the Internet it
would take away the coveted position of distributor and make Internet Service Providers
accountable. If the court system used this standard in libel situations, it would make these
companies liable for what is on appearing on-line.
The ruling gives the operator of a cable television company the right to regulate certain
offensive materials, even if the television channels are leased to third parties.189 These materials are
sexual or excretory activities shown in an offensive manner.190 In other words, the company has the
right to choose what the viewer will or will not be able to watch.
The decision was a 7-2 vote with many concurring and dissenting opinions. That in itself
is probably a silent signal of the toughness of these types of cases. The law suit did not focus on a
government ban on indecent materials, but rather on expression rights between cable company
owners and those who leased channels from them. Although the Court was divided, justices made it
clear they were interested in protecting minors from indecent materials.191
The justices relied heavily on the FCC v. Pacifica ruling because like radio, cable
television is accessible to anyone. Also the Court did not require actual proof that exposure to
indecent materials would cause harm to minors. It accepted the conjectural harm standard. Justices
Clarence Thomas, William Rehniquist and Antonin Scalia did not base their decision on the
indecency issue. Instead they decided that the expression rights of the cable companies took priority
over the rights of the individuals who leased these channels.192 The plurality opinion written by
Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Conner and David
Souter created a hybrid standard.
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They refused to apply the strict scrutiny analysis. Instead they upheld Section 10a of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 that permitted cable television
to refuse to carry channels with offensive materials.193
The Court did agree there are other less restrictive methods that can be used to curtail the
viewing of offensive materials. Least restrictive methods including having parents block certain
shows on individual channels. The Court struck down the idea of having all materials that meet the
“patently offensive” definition on a single channel and having the customer put in writing this
channel was to be blocked by the company. The Court concurred that Section 10a was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the government’s objective of protection children from materials that meet the
patently offensive definition.
Application of this standard to cyberspace gives Internet providers the power to allow any
type of web site or to restrict it by putting some type of block on it that would not allow users to
access the web site. Reno v. ACLU gave Internet users the protection needed to put anything they
wish on a web site. However, neither Denver Area v. FCC or Reno v. ACLU does little to
protectminors from being exposed to indecent materials on the Internet. In both cases adult rights
were protected over the rights of minors.
Both cases are building blocks from which future cyberspace cases will certainly be
decided. Having First Amendment protection and the freedom from being identified already has
created problems and the courts are dealing with these problems now. Indecency is certainly a big
concern for everyone, as well as the court system. Another problem that is starting to be made
known is cyberspace libel. It’s a new territory in which the courts will have to make decisions. The
question is: “Can these decisions be made using tried and true methods or will new ones have to be
made?” “Copyright 2000, Dollie F. Deaton”

CHAPTER FOUR
Libel In Cyberspace
The Internet has much to offer the millions of people who use this new medium daily.194
Not everyone owns a computer, but companies are constantly offering new and affordable deals on
computers that make it possible for just about every family to own one. A few years ago the
American Dream was owing a home, having at least one phone and television set and one or even
two cars. Computers have become a part of that dream. Computers are also available at schools and
the local libraries. Patrons do not pay anything to use them. College students get a free e-mail
address as part of being a student.
Messages between these millions of users are sent instantly and senders usually can
remain totally anonymous. Most private individuals or public corporations has a web site or a chat
room where people can visit and leave messages. Unlike traditional media, these messages stay
there on bulletin boards or on-line newsletters and is read by millions.
That may not be a bad idea unless the information is not true and is put there by someone
seeking revenge against a company or an individual. Every major news medium, television,
newspaper or magazine, has taken advantage of the Internet and created web sites that will allow
them to carry the stories that could not be aired or published because of time constraints or the
amount of pages in the newspaper. Many articles may not be carefully edited or proofed for
content.195 Many newsletters have nothing to do with traditional media. They may be newsletters
from a corporation or a musician or movie star’s fan club. Regardless of the origin, it is all too easy
for unsupervised work to appear on-line and be read by millions. The appearance of this
unsupervised work is a danger that can easily result in libel or defamatory charges.
Currently there have only been a few lawsuits that have tested the waters for libel and
some suits have been settled outside of court.196 There are several reasons for that, one is that lawsuits are very expensive and can drag on for a very long time. It may be cheaper in the long run to
just accept an apology and a correction for what was posted Money has and always will play an
important part in any type of law suit. Most often when a libel suit is filed people want punitive
damages. They want to be compensated monetarily for the harm done to their reputation. If the
sender can be found, that individual may not have anything to get damages from. The least
restrictive method in these types of cases is to merely produce a response to the defamatory article
and hope that it will be read by the millions who use the Internet daily. Another problem is that not
everyone reads every newsletter or bulletin board on the web.
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It would be simply impossible. Therefore, if a defamatory statement is uttered it might be difficult
for the person corporation in question to even know that this type of statement was made about the
individual or corporation unless someone told that person.197 Not knowing libelous statements are
being made about a person or corporation is certainly a reason for not having a suit. However the
reasons for not filing a cyberspace libel suit, there have been a few and are certainly to be more. One
of the first occurred in New York in 1991.
Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc
This case was heard in the U. S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The Court’s decision was applauded by Internet Service Providers because it held that they were not
responsible for materials that are posted by its subscribers. The case involved a bulletin board service
and an Internet Service Provider.
CompuServe is an Internet service provider. For a monthly fee members can access the
Internet as well as search engines and other types of databases such as chat rooms and bulletin
boards. CompuServe had contracted with another company to manage a site titled “Journalism
Forum” under which the company had agreed to “manage, review, create, delete, edit and otherwise
control the contents of the Journalism Forum. In accordance with the editorial style and technical
standards that had been established by CompuServe.”198
One of the newsletters found in the Journalism Forum was “Rumorville USA.” This
bulletin board was managed by Cameron Communications and prepared by Don Fitzpatrick and
Associates. Statements that had appeared in Rumorville USA suddenly appeared on a new bulletin
board called “Skuttlebutt.”
In the suit CompuServe alleged that this information had been “obtained through the back
door and that the developer of this new publication had been fired by a previous employer.”199 In the
countersuit, “Cubby alleged that when it attempted to market a competing database called
Skuttlebutt, postings on Rumorville had defamed Cubby by characterizing the effort as a new startup scam among other things.”200
In a summary judgment, the Court held that: CompuServe's CIS product is in essence an
electronic, for-profit library that carries a vast number of publications and collects usage and
membership fees from its subscribers in return for access to the publications. CompuServe and
companies like it are at the forefront of the information industry revolution. High technology has
markedly increased the speed with which information is gathered and processed; it is now possible
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for an individual with a personal computer, modem, and telephone line to have instantaneous access
to thousands of news publications from across the United States and around the world. While
CompuServe may decline to carry a given publication altogether, in reality, once it does decide to
carry a publication, it will have little or no editorial control over that publication's contents. This is
especially so when CompuServe carries the publication as part of a forum that is managed by a
company unrelated to CompuServe.201
The Court also held that “"First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as
protecting distributors of publications.... Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of
periodicals has no duty to monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes.”202 Because
CompuServe did not have the opportunity to edit the contents of Rumorville before it became public
information, the Court held that CompuServe could not be held liable for Rumorville’s contents.
“CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a public library, book
store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for CompuServe to examine every publication
it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it would be for any other distributor to do so. To
hold otherwise would impose an undue burden on the free flow of information.”203
The ruling made it clear that CompuServe, as the distributor, could not be held for liable
because it did not exercise editorial control over Rumorville. The standard applied in the case is the
same one that is applied to libraries, bookstores and news vendors. These entities are merely
distributors of information. They can not be compared to newspapers and broadcast mediums that
write as well as disseminate information and are judged by different standards when it comes to libel
charges. If a book containing libelous information is found in a library, the library can not be sued.
However, if a newspaper prints libelous materials, the newspaper, publisher, editor and even the
reporter may be sued.
The ruling in Cubby gives an Internet distributor, such as CompuServe, protection
from libelous materials printed in a newsletter such as Rumorville. The ruling described
CompuServe as an electronic library containing numerous publications and having numerous
members that pay a fee. This is similar to the traditional library with its numerous publications and
patrons that use a
library card. In this case, the Court recognized that the Internet, although a new and different
medium, could still be governed by rules that have been in use for many years.
As a result of Cubby, many on-line service providers may try to protect their position as a
distributor and not a publisher, and exercise no editorial control over its on-line materials. As a
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distributor, service providers are not likely to be sued for carrying libelous materials. Even if a
distributor is sued for libel, the standard for proof is lower than if the company is judged to be a
publisher. It is common for companies to provide Internet service to actually have some type of
editorial control but provide disclaimers against libel.
The question of who will exercise editing control or will take responsibility for on-line
materials may become a sensitive issue between service providers and forum operators. Regardless
of who does the editing of such materials as newsletters and bulletin boards, subscribers or Internet
users need to be made aware of the nature and extent of editing that is being done. In order to protect
the status as a distributor, some providers may opt to have absolutely no editorial control at all. If
there is an editorial board, that may mean more expense to the provider and that just means the user
will pay more for the service.
Another area that on-line service providers and forum operators are concerned with is
copyright infringement. They wish the ruling in Cubby would apply to copyright cases as well.
Copyright infringement occurs when someone violates the copyright law by copying or using
original material that someone else has the rights or patent for. It does not matter if the copyright is
done innocently. Copyright infringement suits are found quite often in the music world. Rock
singer John Fogerty found himself in the middle of a rather bizarre copyright infringement suit.
In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s Fogerty was a member of the highly successful rock
band Credence Clearwater Revival (CCR). Not only did he sing lead and play lead guitar, he also
wrote, produced and arranged all the group’s music. CCR’s recording contract was with Fantasy
Records. After the band broke up Fogerty signed with Warner Brothers Records and began a fairly
successful solo career. Just as before he wrote, arranged and produced all of his music.
In the mid 1980’s, Saul Zaentz , then president of Fantasy Records and the remaining
members of CCR sued Warner Brothers Records and John Fogerty claiming that a recording “The
Old Man Down the Road” sounded too much like “Run Through the Jungle,” a song written,
produced and arranged by Fogerty when he was with CCR. Fogerty won this round and “The Old
Man Down the Road” was allowed to be broadcast and performed by Fogerty.
Throughout the past 25 years Fogerty has been plagued with copyright infringement and
plagiarism suits brought by Fantasy Records and former band members, Stu Cook and Doug
Clifford. Although he never did it, it might have been interesting if Fogerty had counter-sued
claiming he could not make a living because he sounded too much like himself. His plight is a good
example how easy it is to break the copyright law and explains why Internet Service Providers are
hoping that the rules for libel will someday apply to that area also.
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Copyright infringement, as libel, is another on-line issue because to the amount of
materials that are posted daily. "Providers cannot and do not monitor or review all this information to
determine whether the messages infringe copyright, defame any individual or otherwise may violate
the law. Conversely, if they were required to do so, the burden would result in no less than bringing
their businesses to a halt almost immediately, cutting off the flow of information and
communications to millions of people."204
If applied to copyright issues, the ruling in Cubby would erase the worry about a
subscriber uploading a copyrighted piece of material. Internet providers would be protected from
being sued and place the copyright infringement squarely on the shoulders of the subscriber that
uploaded the material on-line. This has not happened yet. In 1993 Playboy Magazine sued Fiena, a
bulletin board, that distributed unauthorized copies of some photos that Playboy held the rights to.205
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted as undisputed that:
The defendant "never uploaded any of (Playboy's] photographs onto BBS and that subscribers to
BBS uploaded the photographs"; and "as soon as [the defendant] was served with a summons and
made aware of this matter, he removed the photographs from BBS and has since that time monitored
BBS to prevent additional photographs of [Playboy] from being uploaded."206
The court ruled that this was liable even if it was not known to the bulletin board service
(BBS) operator that a subscriber had uploaded copyrighted material.207 The court found that
Playboy's rights to publicly distribute and display its property had been violated. To the court, BBS’
ignorance in the situation did not matter: "There is irrefutable evidence of direct copyright
infringement in this case. It does not matter that defendant Fiena may have been unaware of the
copyright infringement. Intent or knowledge is not an element of infringement, and thus even an
innocent infringer is liable for infringement.208 Innocence is only relevant in determining statutory
damages.209
Just as in libel cases, the courts are handing down stern decisions regarding copyright on
the Internet. As in the case with Playboy, the message is clear infringement will not be tolerated by
the legal system. Because the findings in Cubby have not been applied to this area, it is still a huge
area of concern for Internet service providers. If each provider claims to be looking out for
copyrighted materials, that could put in question the distributor status they now hold so dearly.
Stratton Oakmont V. Prodigy
The library standard used to decide Cubby was challenged again in 1995. This time the
results were different and affected legislation in the Communication Decency Act. The ruling in
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Stratton Oakmont Inc., v. Prodigy Services Co. is the reason Congress put the “Good Samaritan”
clause in the CDA the following year.
In November 1994 Prodigy, an Internet service provider, was sued for $200 million for
publishing alleged defamatory statements about Stratton Oakmont Inc., a subscriber to Prodigy, but
did learn about the messages a few weeks after they had appeared in on-line. After learning about
the messages, Porush immediately filed a suit charging the statements made were libelous..
These statements appeared on a bulletin board, Money Talk. Several other messages of
the same nature appeared in Money Talk over the next few weeks. These messages claimed the
banking investing firm would soon come to an end and called the president of the firm a soon to be
proven criminal. After some research on the part of Prodigy, it was proven that these messages were
sent from the count of a former Prodigy employee, David Lusby.
Lusby had quit working for Prodigy several years before and although the messages came
from his account, neither side could prove he actually sent them and he was dropped from legal
proceedings. Because the account Lusby had was still operational,
Prodigy found itself in the midst of a nasty cyberspace libel suit.
Prodigy contended that, similar to the holdings in Cubby, its on-line service was similar
to that of a bookstore, library, etc. and therefore was not guilty of libel. On those grounds, the
company asked the case be dismissed. Then New York Supreme Court Justice Stuart Ain denied the
request and ruled against Prodigy. If the library standard had been applied, that would have made
Prodigy merely a distributor and not a publisher. Because Justice Ain had ruled the library standard
did not apply here, Stratton Oakmont had a much stronger case against Prodigy. If Justice Ain had
applied the library standard, there would not have been grounds for a libel case at all.
Prodigy was declared a publisher and not merely a distributor because the company used
software to prescreen things such as obscenities and hate speech. This prescreening software, it was
ruled, was similar to editing in the more traditional mediums, such as an editor looking at the
materials before it is published in a newspaper. Prodigy had also contracted with a board that
monitored and could remove anything considered offensive. Therefore, Judge Ain ruled Prodigy did
exercise editorial control over what was appearing on its on-line publications. CompuServe did not
have prescreening software for on-line publications or an editorial for material such as Rumorville.
Another issue was the way Prodigy sold its on line services to families. Prodigy marketed
itself as a family oriented network that provided prescreening software to filter out inappropriate
materials for minors. That claim was reflected in Justice Ain’s decision. He wrote: “We make no
apology for pursuing a value system that reflects the culture of the millions of American families we
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aspire to serve. Certainly no responsible newspaper does less when it chooses the type of advertising
it publishes, the letters it prints, the degree of nudity and unsupported gossip its editors tolerate.210
The ruling of the court made it quite clear that a company should be held accountable for the way it
markets itself.
Prodigy negotiated a settlement outside of court and provided Stratton Oakmont Inc. and
Porush with a public apology and appealed Judge Ain’s decision. The company asked for its status
as a publisher to be reviewed. As part of the deal Stratton Oakmont agreed not to contest Prodigy’s
appeal.
The appeal was denied. Judge Ain “citing Paramont Communications v. Gabraltar
(1995) which held that “while we appreciate the desirability of settlement, we do not believe it would
be advisable to allow private parties to demand that the Court eradicate precedent which they
personally find unacceptable on threat of burdensome litigation should the Court refuse.”211 The
court found “the original ruling correct as this is a developing area in the law (in which it appears
that the law has thus far not kept pace with the technology) so that there is a real need for some
precedent.”212
The precedent Judge Ain called for in Stratton Oakmont was set earlier in Cubby. The
application of the distributor standard was easily applied. It was not hard to make comparison in
these cases to the more traditional medium. This includes the prescreening software that Prodigy had
been compared to an editor editing a story for a newspaper and the board that looked at the materials
for Prodigy.
The holdings in Cubby set the precedent for determining when to apply the distributor
standard to cyberspace libel suits. It would have been very contradictory to rule in Prodigy’s favor
because of the prescreening abilities and the claim of being a family orientated Internet service
provider. These case were both heard in New York and did not make it to the United States Supreme
Court. Section 230 of the CDA reversed the findings in Stratton.
Although these two cases are similar because of the cyberspace libel charges, they are
also very different in that one exercised editorial control over publications and one did not.
Determining who is or is not a publisher is a crucial step in a libel suit. Using the two standards set
in these two cases will aid courts greatly when making that decision. But because not all Internet
users are trained journalists, perhaps lower standards of negligence might be appropriate for those
untrained journalists. The bottom line is that libel is libel no matter what area it is committed in, and
Internet users should exercise great care when writing on-line publications.
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Another issue that is presented by both cases is the amount of control or editing that an
on-line service provider should have. Should these companies or editorial boards be “cyber cops”
that monitor and prosecute offenders? Or should they merely be bystanders? Because of the rulings
in both Cubby and Stratton Oakmont, service providers and forum operators will certainly want to
make it clear who does the editing, if any, and make that editing very consistent with any policies
and procedures the service provider has.
Zeran v. American Online
This case addressed the uniqueness of the Internet and the fact that messages are
sometimes placed by a third party. These messages are read by millions and, unlike discarded
newspapers, these messages stay on-line and are read more than once to refresh the users memory
about the content of the messages. This may not be a bad idea unless the messages contain bad or
untrue materials. This was the case that involved Kenneth Zeran.
In April 1995, an anonymous user posted a message on an America Online bulletin board
advertising t-shirts that had “tasteless and offensive” slogan about the 1995 bombing in Oklahoma
City.213 The message said those interested should contact Ken and gave Zeran’s phone number.
Needless to say, he received many unpleasant phone calls and even some death threats. Zeran called
AOL and the message was removed. A few days after another one was posted and KRXO, an
Oklahoma City radio station, broadcast news about the ad posted on AOL. Once again the
defamatory message was removed, but not before Zeran received numerous phone calls and death
threats.
Zeran was not a member of AOL and did not have access to its online publications. This
placed him in the predicament of not being able to post a message defending himself. He filed a suit
in federal court claiming the radio station and AOL were negligent and that these defamatory ads had
done a great damage to the publishing company he operated out of his home.
In his suit he argued that AOL should be treated as a publisher. AOL stated it was merely
a distributor and was protected by Good Samaritan Clause or Section 230 of the Communication
Decency Act. This clause prohibits the courts from treating AOL as a publisher. The federal court
ruled against Zeran citing the Good Samaritan Clause. In June 1998, the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.
The question to be solved in this case was whether or not an Internet service provider
could be held liable for defamatory messages posted by a third party. The courts said no. By doing
so this gave companies such as AOL protection from defamatory statements made by subscribers.
The courts recognized that cyberspace has no boundaries and therefore covers a limitless area.
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If the courts had ruled for Zeran, it would have opened Pandora’s box for everyone
including subscribers and service providers. Companies would have had to take responsibility for
every message sent, even those sent through Instant Messager. This would be an impossible task to
accomplish. The extra cost would have been passed on to the subscribers. The time it took to edit
and approve each message, even if it were possible to do such a thing, would greatly affect the time
messages are sent and received. People who use the Internet want things sent as soon as possible.
They simply do not want to sit and stare at a computer screen and wait for something to appear.
Privacy would have been another issue. Knowing that someone else is reading a private
message, such as an Instant Message, could be considered an invasion of privacy because of the
content of this messages. These types of problems would certainly have a chilling effect, if not
putting some Internet Service providers out of business.
While some people viewed the Zeran decision as protection of free speech, others did not.
Granting complete immunity to Internet Service Providers in regards to third party communication
also produced questions and some possible problems that may appear on down the road. No one
disagrees that the Internet provides users with an opportunity to make views known. At the same
time, this new medium also provides an avenue for irresponsible users to do great harm to others by
posting defamatory statements. Since Zeran gave Internet Service Providers totally immunity from
prosecution in third party communications, the question becomes, “Who’s minding the store?”
AOL and others have a clause in their contracts that if third party defamatory materials
are reported, the company will do its best to remove them and find out who posted them. AOL’s
contract also states that AOL will be held harmless as long as the company acts in good faith to
remove these statements. The company also encourage users to report any types of materials that
appear to be libelous. AOL also gives the opportunity for anyone over the age of 18 to have a special
password that will allow uncensored access. Parents can give younger children certain passwords
that will screen user and not the Internet service provider. This protects the distributor position for
Internet companies.
Clauses, such as the ones found in user contracts, do give Internet service providers a
burden to be sensitive to libelous materials. But by not having to worry about prosecution, that may
also give companies such as AOL a lazy attitude. As long as they remove libelous statements as soon
as they are made aware, Internet Service providers are protected and people who are defamed can
post a retraction of their own. However, in Kenneth Zeran’s case, he did not belong to AOL, did not
have to opportunity to remove or retract the statements and was not covered by AOL’s contract.
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Since much of the communication that is posted on-line is third party or someone using a
BBS, this ruling will also reduce the number of defamation suits regarding the Internet. It may not
reduce the amount of libelous materials posted on the Internet, just the chance for the someone to
redeem themselves against libelous statements made by a third party. There may be not as many
cybespace libel cases simply because many users’ pockets are deep enough to retrieve damages.
Bumenthal v. Drudge
This case also involves third party communication. The suit was filed by Sidney
Blumenthal, a communication advisor to President Clinton and former journalist, and his wife
Jacqueline Jordan Blumenthal, director of the President’s Commission on White House Fellowships.
The suit was filled against America Online and Matt Drudge, a writer for on-line publications.
Drudge was hired by AOL and compiled a publication known as the “Drudge Report.”
This report was made available by AOL to its many subscribers. Only a month after being hired by
AOL, he produced an edition of the Drudge Report stating that Sidney Blumenthal was a spouse
abuser and that this information had been discovered in a background check done by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. He also claimed there were court records to back up his allegations but
stated he did not have them. He printed a retraction hours after the article appeared online saying he
had been misled by his sources.
The Blumenthals sued Drudge and AOL for alleged libel, slander and invasion of privacy.
The law suit had heavy political overtones, many of which eluded to President Clinton and a possible
cover-up of information regarding the alleged abuse. Even though Drudge had printed a
retraction hours after the story was posted , the Blumenthals still asked for a retraction, an apology,
$10 million in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages. They also requested
that AOL remove the story at once. AOL claimed protection under Section 230 and the judgment
handed down in Zeran. The Blumenthals claimed that because of clauses in a contractual
agreement between AOL and Drudge both parties should be held liable
A summary judgment in favor of Drudge and AOL was issued by U.S. Court Judge Paul
L. Friedman in April. He based his decision on the Good Samaritan Clause found in Section 230 of
the CDA and the ruling made in Zeran. This ruling extended an earlier decision in the Zeran case
stated that Internet service providers are immune from distributor liability for defamatory statements
made by third parties. The court determined Internet service providers cannot be liable for any
efforts taken in good faith to restrict access to obscene, lewd, excessively violent, harassing or other
objectionable information provided by third parties. These efforts may include blocking, editing
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content and requiring use of credit cards or adult age checks before allowing access to objectionable
information.”214
Granting full immunity to Internet speech also gives Internet service providers the power
to decide what type of speech can be posted and where the speech will appear on-line. Let’s say an
on-line publication posted some “mud slinging material” about one presidential candidate and never
allowed any type of “mud slinging material” to be posted about another one. Even though the
company or bulletin board service gave libel as a defense, it still could be argued that this is an act of
censorship because the company knowingly and willfully removed the material from one candidate
and ran similar material on the other candidate. If a situation such as this occurred, the Internet
service provider could possibly be declared a publisher because it exercised editorial control similar
to what Prodigy did in the Stratton Oakmont case.
The fact that Internet companies can remove any type of posted material, even if it is
considered obscene, is considered censorship and most people are opposed to that. As long as there
is an alternative service the unhappy user can turn to, this should not be a big concern. If you do not
like one Internet service, simply switch. Right now there are quite a few companies to choose from.
However, that may not always be the case. Many smaller companies are folding. UK
Online is a good example of this. For several years, all faculty, staff and students had the privilege
of using a small and cheap Internet service provider. Last year UK Online folded and all users were
given incentives to switch to Prodigy. As more and more smaller Internet Service Providers are
gobbled up by larger ones, who controls speech on the Internet is becoming a tool in the hands of
fewer and fewer. Granting immunity in third party communication has not answered every question
or solved every problem. Granting third party immunity may someday create a double standard for
newspapers.215 Newspapers are considered publishers because editors can read, edit and even decide
what will be in the newspaper. A newspaper can not claim ignorance either. Today the majority of
newspapers have on-line versions also. Suppose a letter to the editor or story contained libelous
statements. What would happen if the mistakes were cleared up in the print version but not in the
on-line version?
Under Zeran, the Internet service provider would not have problems, but could the
newspaper successfully argue the same case and claim the same status? So far this situation has not
happened, but given the amount of unedited material that appears daily it certainly could.
There are many pros and cons to granting complete immunity to Internet Service
Providers in third party communication situations. By and large the decisions handed down by the
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courts have been perceived as a positive thing. These decisions are viewed by most users as
preserving the market place of ideas by allowing free speech on the information highway.
Internet Service Providers do not take this immunity lightly. They are still concerned
with the transmission of smut and the protection of minors. Prodigy still markets itself as a family
orientated service, in spite of the Stratton Oakmont decision. Companies are still trying to develop
software to filter out unsuitable materials, such as child pornography, when it appears on-line. They
also encourage each user to be aware of the risks and responsibilities that can occur when libel and
other related incidents occur and to report them as soon as possible.
Internet service providers appear to be trying to control things such as defamatory
statements, copyright and child pornography. The bottom line is that these companies can not be held
liable for third party communication. Knowing a company can not be prosecuted might take away a
real diligence for being aware of what kinds of materials that are posted on-line. Even if companies
are on the lookout it can be hard to trace down an anonymous user, especially if these messages were
sent from a defunct account.
Another issue here is money. Most people that sue for libel seek punitive damages. The
majority of on-line users don’t have thousands of dollars. Therefore the person being libeled might
have the satisfaction of knowing the other party was prosecuted, but would probably get nothing out
of the case except a big stack of attorney fees. The Courts have made a little progress in defining
rules to govern this new frontier. So far there really have not been that many law suits that have
resulted in all kinds of new rules and precedents to follow. But the super highway is still quite new
and there are still many questions to answer and for sure these will be answered in a court of law.
“Copyright 2000, Dollie F. Deaton”

CHAPTER FIVE
Where do we go from here?
The Internet has vastly changed the way people all over the world communicate. Just as
with any new technology there must be rules to guide users. Some of these rules are in the
agreement that the user signs when obtaining a membership from an Internet service provider. Other
rules are chiseled out in a court of law. Even though a multitude of suits there have not been filed in
conjunction with this new medium, the courts have still laid down some basic principles that are
sure to be applied again and again. There are still areas the courts will have to address. The
remainder of this chapter touches briefly on these.
Publisher/distributor
With the decisions handed down in Cubby, the courts decided Internet Service Providers
were not publishers but merely distributors. Section 230 of the CDA and the ruling in Cubby totally
insulates Internet companies from prosecution and also limited the amount of government intrusion
on Internet speech.
If the Internet company is not the publisher, then just who is? That question is a little
easier to answer if the material comes from a bulletin board or on-line newsletter, such as the
Drudge Report or Money Talk. Many times, as in Kenneth Zeran’s case, the defamation occurs in a
single ad or statement that is posted anonymously. Certainly he received a great deal of damages
from the whole incident, but never found out who posted the ad and was never compensated for it.
Chances are AOL was the only one who might have had enough money to compensate Zeran. When
the Courts gave Internet service providers immunity from prosecution, that nipped many libel suits in
the bud.
Online bulletin boards are a source of concern in themselves. In spite of the errors in the
Drudge report, it might be better if the on-line materials were similar to his and other known names.
Unfortunately, there are many on-line newsletters that are similar to those published by a local
neighborhood organization. In these instances, no one checks for facts or errors. Users just whip
them out and post these publications on-line for millions around the world to read. Chances are that
most of these publications do not contain defamation and certainly not against some celebrity that
might make the national news. However, defamation is defamation no matter if the person is a
celebrity or a private individual. The amount of damage or hurt someone can feel by defamation
should not make a difference if that person is famous or not.
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Journalist
There is also concern for “untrained journalists” who write on-line materials. What are
their qualifications for writing news materials for different types of Internet services? Chances are
most could not really be considered a journalist because they have no real training or understanding
of the laws that control the world of journalism. A person who has no real knowledge of the laws
that govern publications, but attempts to produce one anyway, is similar to a person who can not read
street signs, but drives anyway. It is a dangerous avenue to travel. The decision in Blumenthal could
have possibly enhanced the situation.
If these companies can not be held responsible for third party communications, it might
create a lazy attitude on the part of the Internet service provider as to what is appearing on-line. This
attitude might also make it hard to actually determine who posted bad material, if it is possible to
figure that out. The ability to post material anonymously is probably not the best quality the Internet
has to offer. All most Internet companies have to do is remove the material as soon as it can possibly
be done. But what would happen if a user discovered libelous materials posted on-line, requested the
materials be removed and the Internet Service Provider refused to do so? This has not happened yet,
but if it did it might change the position of the publisher/distributor status.
So far The Drudge Report is the most notable case in on-line publications. Matt Drudge
never billed himself as a trained journalist so that question was never really addressed in his law suit.
He did claim to be correct 80 % of the time. A 20 % error rate is extremely high. No accredited
news organization will ever admit to being wrong 20% of the time.
The case suggested that the courts treat Drudge and people like him with a lower standard
because they are not trained journalists. If the question arises again, and someday it probably will,
the legal system should say, “no way.” If you do not fully understand what you are doing, for
example writing statements on-line about someone, and be willing to take the consequences of what
can happen if it is done wrong, then you simply should not be doing it. And if there is a problem,
then it should make no difference whether you are trained or not.
There are many trained journalist who write or contribute to on-line publications. These
people get training from an accredited college where they are taught not only how to write properly,
but also the laws that govern this medium. Most will end up at newspapers, television stations, etc.
and work under the guidance of an editor while their journalism skills are being sharpened. Editors
carefully edit materials before they are published. They are well aware of the consequences mistakes
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can bring. They pass this knowledge and experience on to their staff. Unlike an on-line publication,
it is quite clear as to “where the buck stops” in the traditional media.
The so-called on-line journalist do not have this clear cut line to follow and the amount of
unedited material that gets posted daily should be a cause for concern. People who write on-line
publications, trained or not, should be considered a journalist and held to the same high standards as
the traditional journalists.
Standards/Rules to go by
Because there have not been many cyberspace suits, the courts are still very new in
deciding what rules apply to what situation. The ruling in Cubby was totally opposite to the ruling in
Stratton Oakmont. Those decisions hinged on the amount of editorial control each Internet service
provider claimed. That is merely just the first step in deciding the rules. The fact that cyberspace is
international may be a potential problem. What would happen if someone in another country
defamed President Clinton? Whose rules would be used to govern the case? The rules that govern
libel in America are far different that in any other country. In England, for example, there are no
restrictions placed on libel suits filed by public figures and officials. In an international libel case,
jurisdiction would also are a problem, but it might also answer the question of whose rules to apply.
The question would be where to hold the case. Even then, the other party might argue it should be
governed by the laws in their country because that’s where the statements in question were posted.
Both parties would certainly want the case to be heard in their country, unless there is a
country, let’s say Russia, which might have the plaintiffs winning most all of the libel suits. But if
that country is not home to neither party, the plaintiffs might argue that the Internet is truly
international, and, therefore, they want to have their case heard in Russia just because they feel they
have a better chance of winning. That scenario would also work if there was a country where the
defendants in libel suits won all the time. Then the defendant would want the case to be heard in that
particular country. This would create many questions for deciding jurisdiction when the cases are
international.
Another question besides jurisdiction would be how to categorize a person. There are
rules that are used to decide what determines a public figure or a private individual. When a user gets
on-line, that person enters a marketplace with millions of people in it. What happens if one user
makes libelous statements about something or someone. Does the fact that the user voluntarily
“jumped” into the middle of the conversation make him a limited purpose public figure or a private
individual. If the user is determined to be a limited purpose public figure because he/she voluntarily
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thrust himself/herself in the middle of a controversy, then the actual malice rule must apply. So far,
New York Times v. Sullivan rule has not been applied, but it be easily could be if necessary.
Damages
Damages that are awarded to people in cyberspace lawsuits are identical to the number of
cases are few and far in between. Because of the anonymity of most users it is almost impossible to
determine the identity of the person who posts a message on the Internet. Even if the person posting
the message is found, that person may not financially have anything from which to retrieve damages.
Another consideration is the fact that messages are posted instantly. Retractions and
apologies can also be posted just as quickly. Traditional publications, on the other hand, must wait
until the next issue is printed. The question becomes, “Are there less damages because the retraction
can be printed the same day as the error?” If that becomes the rule, then there will be less damages
for the plaintiffs to argue about.
The fact that Internet service providers can not be held liable for the material that appears
is sure to cut down on the number of libel cases. With the millions of on-line publications, including
on-line newspapers, there will still be times when these issues will have to be settled. If publication
from a bulletin board service is involved, the contract between the Internet Service Provider and the
bulletin service will be closely scrutinized. The Courts may be able to hold the Internet Service
Provider responsible depending on what the contract says about editorial control. If a case like this
should arise, it would certainly set a precedent and force the legal system to take a much harder look
at cases before relying on the decisions in Cubby and Zeran. This type of case would be more in line
with the decision in Stratton Oakmont. Still in its infancy, the Internet is the most rapidly growing
new technology. It will continue to change the way communications and news dissemination are
done.
Although the Internet is international, that does not mean that another country will apply
the same rules that they apply to traditional means of communications. Governments in other
countries may choose to redefine libel laws when it comes to cyberspace. This has not happened yet,
but even if a single country does this might influence the way other countries, including U.S., thinks.
If nothing else it should certainly encourage people to learn something about the rules that other
countries have regarding the Internet, if they choose to be a party to on-line conversations with a
user that is in another country.
There are still many questions about the Internet that remain to be answered. In the few
cases that have been brought before courts. It has been able to use standards and rules that have been
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the standards for many years. The courts have had no problems applying First Amendment
applications to the few cases that have been brought before them. Still, there are many that wonder if
the rules that were carved out over the last 200 years can still apply to a new technology so different
from anything else that the world has experienced. So far the courts, at least in the U. S., have
answered that question loud and clear. The courts have not had a problem in applying the First
Amendment to cyberspace lawsuits. Not a single word had to change in The First Amendment to
accommodate this new and ever growing technology. “Copyright 2000, Dollie F. Deaton”
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